

THE PROBLEM
OF
NATIONAL DEFENCE

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IT is probable that every man who has given the smallest consideration to the subject of war has been greatly impressed by certain curious anomalies. He has found that armies have, before battle, constantly prayed to the Almighty for support, that many generals have ascribed their victories to the assistance, while others have attributed their defeats to the displeasure, of a divine power. Cromwell, a notable

case in point, invariably, with tremendous vehemence, claimed the protection of the Almighty, asserting that it was not the arm of flesh, but the Spirit of God, which enabled him to triumph over his enemies and those of his country and of heaven. And, just of late, we have seen the Japanese generals and admirals refuse to accept the credit for their victories by land and sea, ascribing them to the virtue of the Emperor and the assistance of Heaven. But the student of war will not fail to have noticed that Cromwell, as well as all other successful leaders who have ascribed their victories to Providence, by no means put their whole trust in divine assistance, by no means disregarded the value of a worldly weapon; on the contrary, they have displayed the utmost solicitude in the construction and temper of that weapon. But why, the student asks himself, why, if the cause is just, should it be necessary to fight at all? The enemy can be destroyed, if Providence wills, as was Sennacherib's army, by the breath of the angel of the Lord; whereas, if Providence wishes to destroy you, nothing you can do will avail to avert disaster. And, then, there comes Napoleon's answer: "God marches with big battalions"; as well as the proverb: "Providence helps those who help themselves." The student remembers that proverbs are the outcome of many centuries—possibly thousands of years—of experience; and, if he be of an inquiring turn of mind, he will sooner or later seek for the truth in the pages of history or in the annals of war. He will discover that

there is such a thing as the science of tactics, or the application of force on the battlefield, and of strategy, or the preparation and application of force in the theatre of war, which, on many occasions at least, exercised, apparently, a decisive effect on the battlefield. Which of these theories is true? Is Napoleon correct—is it the case that the divine power marches with the big battalions, with the more skilful? Or is it that virtue alone is the force which wins victories? Or is it, again, the case that Providence sometimes, or perhaps always, stands aloof and pays no attention to the petty and sordid squabbles of mankind? If the first or last of these be correct, then it is evident that armaments are necessary; whereas if the second be true, all armaments are evidently not only useless and wasteful extravagance, but positive wickedness.

It is clearly a point of great importance, to Englishmen especially; for, as is very well known, there are many people in Great Britain who believe that, if the nation displays virtue in its dealings with its neighbours, the Almighty will protect it from all harm. Many go further, and maintain—and their contention is quite logical—that war in the abstract is wicked, and that the employment of force, or compulsion in any form, is criminal. Yet, again, many who hold this belief refuse, nevertheless, to follow the train of argument to its logical conclusion. Providence may surely be trusted to guard the righteous man; and a police force, also, is both wicked and unnecessary?

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No, comes the answer; for, unfortunately, human nature is in its very essence wicked; and men of criminal tendencies must be suppressed by force in the interests of the community. Then, are there never nations with criminal tendencies? Should not a virtuous nation, like a virtuous man, take steps to guard itself?

There is, again, another section of the community which considers that though virtue must in the end prosper, that yet the ways of Providence are inscrutable, that the wicked are sometimes permitted to triumph, that modern man, living in a world in which self-seeking and lack of scruple are not entirely unknown, must adopt measures to safeguard himself and his possessions by means of a police force, and that nations must act in a similar manner. These deny the justice of an aggressive war, but admit the justification for a defensive one.

There are yet others—though in Great Britain these are in a minority—who boldly assert that fraud and force dominate humanity, and that the wicked and unscrupulous usually triumph. These are inclined to laugh at national scruples. They point out that every nation which goes to war claims to have the right of it, and that controversy rages over the rights and wrongs of it sometimes for centuries after the war has terminated. These will cry out, first win your war, and then discuss the ethics of it.

Can this point not be determined by the study of history? Is it impossible to discover the instances in

which a virtuous nation was clearly protected by the Almighty, and those in which the wicked nations were struck down by a justly incensed Providence? Or, if the application of force be the chief factor, will it not become apparent from the study of history? History is a vast storehouse of authenticated facts, which can be collected and marshalled, and from which inferences may be drawn. Are we not then justified in an attempt to arrive at some solution of this momentous problem? We Englishmen are, indeed, driven to make the attempt if we desire to seek the solution of the problem of defence in a scientific manner. For, under present circumstances, the nation is, broadly speaking, divided into four parties in time of war: the very few who fight; those who urge that the war should be prosecuted with the utmost vigour; those who weep and wring their hands, or even assist the enemy; and the great mass of the people, who consider that their duty is limited to a spirit of aloofness, that, having paid their gate-money in the shape of salaries to sailors and soldiers, they have the right to applaud or criticise according as the few fighting men of the nation display courage and ability, or the reverse.

Is it not the case, moreover, that even soldiers—and, possibly, sailors too—are still apt to regard war as of the nature of a pastime, a thing at which medals and promotion may be won, and not at all as a serious crisis in the career of a nation—a crisis which may result in defeat, to be followed, perhaps, by the utter

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misery of the whole people? General Von der Goltz, in his *Nation in Arms*, writes that "a true comprehension of the nature of war does not contribute least of all to the martial efficiency of a nation."

We shall surely do wisely, then, to glance through the history of the lives of the nations, and to form a true conception, if it be possible, of the nature of war. Let us, in the first instance, ask ourselves a definite question, and endeavour to ascertain the extent to which force affects the life of a nation.

The Israelites, having settled in Palestine, were at constant war with their neighbours. A nation of warriors, they, under the leadership of Joshua and David, struck down and subjugated the surrounding tribes. They rose rapidly to power, entered into league with the Phœnicians, and became great in commerce as they had been great in war. Under Solomon their riches were proverbial, but the people were heavily taxed to support the magnificence of the king. At the death of Solomon they appealed to Rehoboam, his successor, for a reduction of taxation. He refused, saying, "My father chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions." A portion of the nation thereupon seceded; dissension and discord replaced unity of purpose; and the nation, engaged in its internal conflicts, neglected to watch its neighbours. The Assyrians, a warlike nation on its borders, came down and carried off ten tribes into captivity. Some four centuries later the remain-

ing two tribes were subjugated, and the Israelites ceased to exist as an independent nation. They were destroyed by force.

The Assyrians thereafter conquered the whole of Palestine, and quickly became the dominant power in the known world. A successful rebellion of the Babylonians, who inhabited a province of the Assyrian empire, wrested the supreme power from the hands of the Assyrians, and the Assyrian Empire became the vast and powerful Babylonian Empire. It had now no enemy to fear, for it was at peace with its neighbours, the Lydians in Asia Minor, while the barbarous Medes and Persians were at war with one another. The warrior class appears to have fallen under the domination of the priesthood; and from having been, formerly, a nation of warriors, the community developed into a nation of civilians.

It was at this time that the Persians, under Cyrus, finally defeated the Medes; and the two nations were amalgamated into one great military nation. The Babylonians and Lydians became frightened, and they formed an alliance against the Persians in which Egypt was included. The Babylonians and Egyptians were not ready, however, and the Lydians commenced the war single-handed. They were defeated, and their country was invaded and conquered. Meanwhile the Babylonians fortified their capital. But a few years later Cyrus attacked them; a great battle was fought outside the walls of Babylon, in which the Babylonians were defeated; the city was captured and

destroyed. Egypt was, in its turn, conquered, and the boundaries of the Persian Empire were gradually extended from the Indus to the Mediterranean.

The Persians appear to have passed through the same process of evolution as the Babylonians and Egyptians before them—they ceased to be a warrior nation, and became enervated by luxury. Failing to conquer the Greeks, who at that time were a vigorous and warlike people, they themselves were conquered, and the vast empire collapsed.

Shortly before the destruction of the Persian Empire, the Athenians had risen to power as an empire of the Eastern Mediterranean. Their strength was based on the sea, and they regarded themselves as the Mistress of the Seas. At the time of their rise they had been a warrior nation, in which every man was liable to fight for his country. But their great statesman and orator, Pericles, seeing "war lowering from the Peloponnesus," thought it a fit time to discard the principle of universal liability to carry arms in favour of a mercenary system. He gained great popularity thereby; but his prophecy proved correct, and war shortly afterwards broke out with the Spartans. The latter were a nation of land warriors with an insignificant fleet. The Athenians decided to confine their operations to the sea, and to the conquest of colonies. They fortified Athens, together with a covered way from the city to the harbour. The Spartan fleet was quickly driven into its harbours; the Spartan armies, however, marched

overland to the neighbourhood of Athens, and drove the Athenian country inhabitants inside the walls of the city, closely blockading it on the land side. The Athenians conquered many colonies, and carried out some successful raids into Spartan territory ; but they made no serious attempt to face the Spartan armies on land, or to strike a blow at Sparta itself. Overcrowded in their city, they were suddenly stricken by a terrible plague. The war, as was often the case in those days, continued for many years. The Athenians firmly established their power on the sea ; and, finally, undertook the invasion of Sicily in place of striking at Sparta. The great invasion failed disastrously ; the power of the Athenians was sadly reduced, and the Spartans again entered upon a struggle at sea. One Spartan fleet was captured, another defeated ; but at last the Athenian fleet, resting secure in its overconfidence, was surprised and destroyed by the newly formed Spartan fleet. Athens, blockaded both by sea and land, was quickly starved into submission and forced to surrender.

The Spartans themselves were destroyed by the Thebans ; the Thebans by Alexander the Great, thirty thousand of them being sold into slavery.

The Phœnicians, a peaceful nation of merchants, had entered into league with all the great empires—the Egyptians, Israelites, Assyrians, Persians—successively ; but, in spite of their careful avoidance of war, their cities were taken, and their power utterly destroyed by Alexander the Great, to whose designs

against Persia the commerce and control of the Eastern Mediterranean were essential. The Carthaginians, an offshoot of the Phœnicians, a civilian people, and Rulers of the Seas, were destroyed by the Romans, a nation of land warriors.

But, it may be remarked, these were pagan nations ; things have been different since the advent of Christianity.

The Romans themselves, a nation of Christians, when enervated by luxury, were destroyed by barbarians. The Byzantines were reduced to impotence by their co-religionists, the Venetians and Crusaders, and were finally destroyed by the Turks.

It has been said of the Venetians that they succumbed to other causes than force, though they were finally destroyed by force. They primarily rose to prominence, and became the great commercial and maritime power of the Mediterranean, by the defeat of the Genoese. By force or fraud they obtained large territories from the Byzantines ; and for the assistance they afforded to the Crusaders they were appointed "Rulers of the Sea for ever" by the Pope. Unfortunately the Turks did not believe in the Pope, and, after a prolonged struggle, they wrested the command of the Mediterranean from the Venetians. Meanwhile, the discovery of America and the Cape route to the East transferred the bulk of the commerce of the world from Venice to Spain and Holland. But, nevertheless, the Venetians still possessed vast riches ; their wealth, and the luxury of the

upper classes, were proverbial; they were by no means ruined by the loss of their commerce. They could still afford to maintain mercenary armies, though not in sufficient numbers to withstand their numerous enemies. Their territories on the mainland were consequently conquered from them, and their boundaries were gradually pushed back to the immediate neighbourhood of Venice itself. Their power was reduced to insignificance, and, finally, their city was taken without fighting by Napoleon, and their most treasured possessions removed to France. When too late, the lower classes made an effort to resist the French invaders, but, needless to say, without success.

The Poles, the upper classes enervated by luxury, and the whole nation rendered helpless by the discord and intrigue of the nobility, were partitioned by the neighbouring nations. The lower classes, when too late, fought bravely for their independence, but without success. The Poles still make spasmodic efforts to recover their nationality, but the slightest signs of a true national resurrection will assuredly be stamped out on the instant by Germany.

Though the Spaniards are by no means an extinct nation, yet they were, at one time, in the period of the Hapsburg supremacy, the dominant power in Europe. It will be well, therefore, to inquire briefly into the causes which have led to their downfall from their high estate.

With the discovery of America and the Cape route to the East, the commerce of the world, as we have

seen, flowed into Spain and Holland, which latter country was, at that time, a dependency of the Spanish crown. With the conquest of Mexico and Peru, the vast wealth of those countries in the shape of treasure was brought to Spain, while the merchants of the Netherlands were regarded both by Charles V and Philip II as an unfailing source of wealth. The Spaniards thus suddenly became the richest nation of the day. But the commercial communities of the Netherlands rose in rebellion against the extortions of Spain, and of the vast ecclesiastical organisation which had been established by the Church, and which dominated every corner of the country.

A prolonged struggle ensued, in which the Netherlands established their power on the sea-coast of the present Holland, while the Spaniards retained control of the interior and of the coast of Belgium. The Spanish efforts to suppress the rebellion on the north-west coast proved unsuccessful, owing chiefly to the constant support which the rebels received from the British Islands. The Spaniards were thus obliged to undertake the conquest of the latter country, if they would confirm their hold on the Netherlands. The attempt was, however, frustrated by the destruction of the Spanish Armada. Thereafter the victors, the English and Dutch, interrupted the oversea communications between Spain and her American colonies; and, gradually establishing their power on the sea, finally severed those communications, and cut off the oversea resources of the Spanish nation.

In the Thirty Years War, and the gradual rise of the French power, the overland communications between Spain and the Netherlands were similarly severed. The loss of these communications, both oversea and overland, resulted in the loss of the Netherlands and the practical secession of the colonies. At one stroke the sources of wealth were thus lost.

The Spaniards had, however, employed mercenaries; while the Spanish people, finding that wealth was to be more easily obtained from their outlying possessions than by hard work, had practically discarded all manufactures and industries, leaving these pursuits to the Moors, or Mohammedans, in the country. The wealthy classes, moreover, regarded work as beneath them, and lived in extraordinary magnificence and luxury. It was at this juncture, in the seventeenth century, just when Spain required all her resources to enable her to meet the challenge of the powerful French nation, that her fanatical king, Philip III, drove the whole Moorish population out of Spain. Spain, weakened and almost helpless, was promptly attacked by France, and her remaining possessions, north of the Pyrenees and in the Netherlands, were conquered from her. It has been estimated that, at this period, from one cause and another, the Spaniards lost some eight millions of their population. Torn by discord and dissension, without working men or fighting men, their colonies either seceded or were wrested from them by the British, they dropped rapidly to the level of a third-rate power, and sank

into a state of lethargy, from which they only awakened by the irruption of Napoleon with his hordes of Frenchmen.

Enough examples have perhaps been given to show that it is force, pure and simple, which decides whether a nation shall continue to exist; it is by defeat in war, which seems to follow inevitably on decadence, that a nation comes by its death. If further examples are required they are to be found in the conquest of Mexico and Peru by the Spaniards; and in the destruction of the Red Indian races of North America, and of the aboriginal races of Australia, by the European colonists.

The Spartans would appear to have been the single instance of a nation which was destroyed in spite of its military efficiency; but the numbers of their men, which were limited by the law of the land, proved insufficient to hold possession of an extended empire, and the single heavy defeat which was inflicted on them by the Thebans destroyed their power and capacity to show front to the numerous enemies that rose against them in the moment of disaster. And, moreover, though still a nation of warriors, they had lost, to a great extent, that stern simplicity for which they had formerly been renowned, and which is the basis of military efficiency.

It would seem that we are justified in the assertion that no nation has died a natural death, but that all have been destroyed by war, that is, by their neighbours. If this contention be admitted, then it is a

point of tremendous significance, for the same is said, by naturalists, to be true of wild animals. It may thus be true that nations, like every form of life, are eternally engaged in the struggle for existence. This theory receives support from the study of the causes of war between nations.

Almost every military writer has been driven to the attempt to discover the causes of war. Foremost amongst those which have been given us are the ambitions of kings and princes, religious or political differences.

Of the great military historians, Jomini has given no less than nine different causes of war, all of which may, however, be combined under three heads—aggression, resistance to aggression, and religion. He himself is inclined to eliminate religion as a cause of war, and there is much evidence in history which supports his view that in most, if not in every case, a political motive underlies the religious motive.

Clausewitz is inclined to avoid the subject, and seems content to assume that war is due to the desire of one nation to impose its will on another.

These two great military writers, however, lived before the great scientists, and had never heard of the expression, the struggle for existence.

If we assume the struggle for existence as a working hypothesis, we can attempt to construct a theory of the probable causes of war in prehistoric and ancient times; and in our endeavour we can perhaps

find assistance from the conditions of existence of savage tribes at the present day. Let us venture the attempt, even at the risk of being regarded as pedantic theorists ; for we must remember that the much-abused theory is, after all, the basis of experimental effort and progress.

Let us conceive the first few families of man, each of them consisting of a patriarch with his sons, grandsons, and, perhaps, great-grandsons, with their wives and children. These lived principally on the proceeds of the chase. A hunting ground, the fishing in a river, would form a bone of contention between two or more such families. These things are, as we know, an unfailling cause of war between savage tribes of to-day.

That family which possessed the greater number of bold and energetic men would hold a great advantage over the others, and that advantage would be materially increased if it could attack its neighbours unawares, at night time, while the victims slept. We can imagine, moreover, that two or more of these might combine, that is, form an alliance to withstand the depredations of a powerful neighbour, or to attack unexpectedly, and destroy him and seize his property. An offensive alliance, if secret, would hold certain obvious advantages—it would afford a prospect of the surprise of the adversary, and his destruction by overwhelming force ; while a mere defensive alliance, especially if it came to the knowledge of the opponent, would hand over the initiative, together with the

power of surprise and the opportunity to strike at each of the allies in turn, to the enemy.

It seems but natural that, by degrees, mankind should come to be separated—by great natural features, such as rivers, seas, deserts, and mountain ranges—into distinct clans, each one consisting of numerous families, bound together by a community of interest, the necessity for combination against the depredations of its neighbours, and that they should seek to utilise these natural boundaries as obstacles behind which to defend themselves. Or, if superior in numbers and power to their neighbours, they would naturally seek to hold both outlets to any passage which might exist across an obstacle, with a view to sudden raids and the seizure of the neighbours' property.

But as such a community increased in numbers, so it would become too large to live entirely on the proceeds of the chase; it would be driven to keep herds of cattle, to agriculture and commerce, to expand its territories, and to conquer new lands for its surplus population. But from the moment commerce and barter made their appearance, the water-way, the river or sea, would become of importance as a means of communication, while the valley of the river on both banks would become valuable as pasturage and arable land. The more powerful community would naturally seek to control the water-way, to gain possession of both banks. Or, it might be, that a community, existing with difficulty in a sterile and inhospitable

region, would seek to oust its neighbours from the rich and fertile valleys.

And now, if we turn to history, we find much evidence in support of this theory. Constantly, from the earliest periods, we find that communities living in sterile regions have sought to drive out their more fortunate neighbours. Thus the Arabians, not content with their deserts, forced their way into Palestine, the valleys of the Tigris, Euphrates, and the Nile. The German barbarians, with their vast and steadily increasing numbers, could at last no longer be restrained by the might of the Roman Empire. The Norsemen, from their bleak home, drove southwards across the sea, forming settlements in France, the British Islands, and on the Mediterranean coasts. While, in later days, the Scottish Highlanders were with the utmost difficulty tied down to their mountain fastnesses.

But yet more useful evidence is to be found in a consideration of the influence of water-ways on the existence of nations. The Romans, having conquered Italy, pressed oversea to the conquest of Sicily, the north coast of Africa, Spain, Greece, Palestine, and Egypt; the Mediterranean was converted into a Roman lake. The Saracens were not content with Asia and Africa; they forced their way across the Mediterranean into Europe, through Spain into France, through Turkey to the very gates of Vienna, into Italy and the south of France. The English sought, for a hundred years, to achieve the conquest

of France. The Spaniards, controlling the Netherlands, found it necessary, as has been seen, to attempt the conquest of the British Islands; the Dutch assisted the English in the innate conviction that the subjugation of the British Islands must involve the ultimate and complete subjugation of the Netherlands. Thereafter the four western nations of Europe—England, France, Holland, and Spain—fought indiscriminately with each other for the control of the narrow waters, as well as for the control of the Atlantic and the further bank.

At the end of the fifteenth century the Danes had practically established their control over the outlet of the Baltic, exacting dues from all other nations who sought to obtain either ingress or egress. The Swedes wrested this control from the Danes; but not content with their success, sought to convert the Baltic into a Swedish lake, and to conquer and annex the territories which surround it. The Russians, since their rise to power as a great nation, have sought to convert the Black Sea into a Russian lake; while the intention to deal similarly with the Baltic, in time, has been constantly ascribed to them. Since the destruction of the Russian fleets fears have been expressed that the Germans may, in the future, endeavour to establish control over the Baltic; the late expedition of the British fleet into that sea appears to have been accepted as a hint that so long as the British power exists, German pretensions will not be admitted, for we now see—or, so it has been reported—the

Germans enter into league with the Danes to ensure the control of the entrance in time of war. The Japanese have lately forced their way across the narrow waters into Corea and Manchuria, and now control those waters. The French and the Germans have fought for centuries for dominion on both banks of the Rhine; the French, having in 1870-1 been driven from the Rhine, have pressed across the Mediterranean, in the line of least resistance, into North Africa; and by the establishment of judiciously placed naval bases, seek, apparently, to ensure their supremacy in the Western Mediterranean.

Is it the case that these great struggles have been due to the mere ambition of kings or statesmen? Are they not rather due to the ambition of nations or to vital necessity? Was it ambition or vital necessity which impelled the Spanish Empire to attempt the conquest of England? The Spaniards failed, and from that day the gradual decay of the nation dates. Was it ambition or vital necessity which impelled the Japanese to strike for a footing on the mainland? Will it be ambition or vital necessity which will, in the future, impel the Germans to strike out for the absolute control of seas and of new territories?

The necessity for expansion, for an appropriation of fresh territory on which to settle the surplus population, is, it seems probable, a fruitful source of war. An almost irresistible and unconscious movement of whole nations occurs from time to time which can

only be accounted for by such an explanation. When such a movement takes place, it can only be checked and finally brought to a standstill by the opposition of an equally vigorous and more powerful adversary ; but, then, it merely turns into the line of least resistance.

It appears to be the case that the movement of a people often receives an impulse in a certain direction by pressure on the other side. Thus hordes of barbarians, escaping from the savage Huns, prayed for territories south of the Danube in the eastern Roman Empire, and, being refused, forced their way in, and were only stopped in their advance on Byzantium by the cunning of the Emperor, who diverted them towards the western Roman Empire. We read that the German forests and morasses were, after the great invasions of the Roman Empire, still seething with vast multitudes of barbarians, and that their numbers had not apparently diminished in the smallest degree. The westward movement of the Turks through Asia Minor, which had been temporarily checked by the Byzantines and the furious counterstrokes of the Crusaders, appears to have received a fresh impulse from the pressure of the Mongols on their eastern borders. The Turks then forced their way through the Balkan Peninsula, and were only finally brought to a standstill by the vigorous nations of Central Europe. Is it not possible that another such vast national movement is about to commence, where so many others are believed to have originated—in Eastern

Asia? There is no reason to doubt that these national movements take place to-day, as in ancient times; the difference lies in the fact that whereas in the days of antiquity they appear to have been unconscious or but semi-conscious, to-day they are foreseen, premeditated, and prepared.

Are we not justified in the assertion that war is as often due to vital necessity as to ambition; that it is generally due to a combination of both; and that it is almost impossible for us to judge which of these two motives is the one by which a nation is actuated? Should we not say that war arises from the struggle to exist? If that be so, then our whole conception of the nature of war becomes altered; it is no game at which the bulk of the people should stand aloof and look on to applaud or criticise; it is a serious matter in which every man, woman, and child of a community is deeply concerned.

The study of history gives us numberless examples which all point to the inference that war, not only between nations, but between various sections of a community, is due to the desire to merely exist, to win comfort and luxury, or to satisfy ambition. The three motives would seem to be but one—self-interest. Men band together from motives of self-interest; and is this sentiment not the cause of that unceasing class hostility, that never-ending struggle between rich and poor, which is to be found in every page of history, and which has existed in every community, whether ancient or modern?

The student of war will fail to find a single case in history of a community which has engaged in war in pursuit of some high ideal alone, unaccompanied by some very strong, if hidden, motive of self-interest.

There are many who will take exception to this statement, who will point to the wars of the Reformation, to those of the French Republic, and to the War of Secession in America. Were not these, they will ask, entered upon in pursuit of a high ideal—religious freedom, liberty, and the abolition of slavery? But if we examine into the causes of these wars, we find that a pronounced motive of self-interest underlay, in each case, the high ideal.

As regards the wars of the Reformation, it is very noticeable that the numerous creeds that arose on all sides conformed to the political ideas of the exponents. Thus Lutheranism in North Germany sought to prove that there was no divine warrant for the pretension of the Church to control both the minds, bodies, and possessions of the people throughout the world. It appears to have been merely the religious expression of a sentiment which had already taken a firm hold on the minds of the secular rulers of the countries of Northern Europe which were furthest removed from the influence and resources of the Church. The movement received powerful support from those princes who wished to be masters in their own dominions; and it was eagerly caught at by the business communities of the Netherlands, which sought to throw off the Spanish domination together

with the ecclesiastical supremacy and system of extortion with which it was so closely interwoven. But then, it will be argued, this so-called religious war arose in pursuit of the high ideal of liberty. In answer to this argument we may point out that the reformers not only cut adrift from the orthodox Church, but seized its vast possessions; and that it was the attempt of the Emperor Charles V to oblige the Protestant states of North Germany to relinquish their booty which was the real cause of these wars, which were distinctly predatory in their origin.

Henry VIII, "Defender of the Faith"—that is, of the Catholic faith—adopted and introduced the Reformation into England in order that he might divorce his wife, become undisputed master in his own dominions, seize the wealth of the Church, and thus avoid the dangerous expedient of the taxation of the people. The movement of revolt against the ecclesiastical supremacy had, indeed, commenced many centuries before Lutheranism made its appearance, and had only failed in the days of Wycliffe and Huss owing to the vast strength of the ecclesiastical organisation. These wars were undoubtedly of the same nature as that struggle between rich and poor which is eternally in progress; they were the first direct blow struck by democracies against despotism since the break-up of the Roman Empire, and since the formation of the new European nations. This blow was struck at the despotism which was most apparent—that of the

Church. The movement, having been successful, quickly developed, in Western Europe, into a movement against the despotism of kings, and found its religious expression in Calvinism, which had its origin in Switzerland, the birthplace of democracy.

Calvinism denied the necessity for bishops or high Church functionaries, and sought to place the ecclesiastical power in the hands of councils of presbyters, partly ministers, partly laymen. It maintained that all men were predestined to be good or wicked, foredoomed to eternal happiness or to eternal damnation. It is evident that if a bishop and a swineherd are neither of them responsible for their actions, the one can be no better than the other ; and this was a religion eminently suited to the needs of a community about to revolt against its rulers. Calvinism made its way through Holland, and arrived, in the shape of Presbyterianism and Puritanism, in the British Islands, shortly before the Great Rebellion. The former was taken up by the Scots ; the latter was caught at eagerly by the rebels in England. For it had become even more democratic than Calvinism ; it denied the right of ecclesiastical assemblies to dictate even in religious matters, and maintained the absolute religious freedom of all men.

But these movements were not allowed to pass unchallenged. The Jesuitical creed, or the counter-reformation, was, as its name implies, an attempt to check the spread of the Reformation and to re-establish the supremacy of the orthodox religion. It was finally

successful in Poland, South Germany, France, and Spain, the countries which lay closest to the central power of the orthodox church.

Arminianism also arose to combat Calvinism. "In Arminianism," in Mr. Morley's words, "Predestination was countered by Free Will";¹ or, in other words, the bishop and the prince were better men than the swineherd. It was evidently suited to the requirements of a ruling class in its resistance to the rebellious masses. Arminianism was brought to England, where it was adopted by the Court party, and gradually developed into Episcopalianism. To quote Mr. Morley again, Arminianism "rapidly became in England the corner-stone of faith in a hierarchy, a ceremonial Church, and a monarchy." An ecclesiastical organisation, with great Church functionaries and their subordinates, was the essence of Episcopacy, and, as is obvious, such a system is a valuable support to a throne. It was the method adopted by Philip II of Spain to bolster up his supremacy in Holland, and it was equally the manner in which Charles I sought to establish his supremacy in England and Scotland. These "religious wars" would appear to have been the outcome of class hostility; and the fact should not be disregarded that this class hostility—the movement of democracy against despotism, of the masses against the privileged classes, of poverty against wealth—is distinctly predatory in its origin. It is in progress in most countries of the world at

¹ *Oliver Cromwell*, by John Morley.

this present day, even as it was a notable feature of the histories of the ancients.

As to the close relation between political and religious disputes there can be no doubt, for, as Mr. Morley writes, "all history shows us how theological ideas abound in political aspects to match." The question arises, does religion give rise to political dispute, or does the latter give rise to the former? There is certainly much evidence in history to show that religious dispute is the outcome of political dispute, and that the variations of religious dogma are very often evolved, accepted, and utilised as a means to an end, not only by individual men, but by whole communities. And in this connexion we may again quote Mr. Morley: "In the sardonic dialogue upon these times which he calls *Behemoth*, Hobbes says that it is not points necessary to salvation that have raised all the quarrels, but questions of authority and power over the Church, or of profit and honour to Churchmen. In other words, it has always been far less a question of what to believe, than of whom to believe. 'All human opinions, even those of theologians, have secret motives in the conduct and character of those who profess them' (Nisard)."

This problem of religion and war is, however—it will be freely admitted—a vast problem which can by no means be thus summarily disposed of. But it is sufficient for our present purpose to show that there exists good reason to believe that all war has been due to self-interest and to the predatory instinct.

It is very likely for this reason that the great empire, which has nothing to gain and everything to lose by war, will always seek to avoid a serious war ; while the poverty-stricken nation, with everything to gain and little to lose, will seldom hesitate. Deeper study of these questions will probably disclose the fact that all war, whether civil or external, is due to economic causes, and that religious differences, though they undoubtedly serve to embitter a struggle, are never in themselves a cause of war.

The wars of the French Republic are now recognised as having been due, in the first instance, to resistance on the part of the French to the aggression of the neighbouring monarchies, which feared the spread of the revolutionary doctrines, and, incidentally, sought to take advantage of the helplessness of France ; and, later, to the national ambition of the French, a predatory instinct.

As regards the War of Secession in America, Colonel Henderson tells us that, between North and South, there "had gradually sprung up a spirit of bitter hostility, created by collision on questions of the tariff and finance, and intensified by a wide difference in social life and habits." He points out that the abolition of slavery was quite an indirect cause of war, even if it existed as a cause of war at all ; that the North drew the sword to punish the South as rebels, "and by no means with the purpose of giving freedom to the slaves."¹

¹ *The Science of War.*

If history teaches true, there is no resting-place for nations ; they must fight on, and either destroy their enemies or meet destruction at their hands. War would appear to be mere competition between nations ; that is, "natural selection" would seem to be a law of nature which is as applicable to the world of nations as it is to the animal and vegetable worlds. It is an indisputable fact that progress is impossible without rivalry and competition ; and it would really appear that nature, like the British public, refuses to tolerate a monopoly or a "trust." Healthy rivalry is, at all times, apt to degenerate into jealousy, which, in its turn, unless there exists some object of hate common to both rivals, develops quite naturally into bitter hostility. Hence it is, perhaps, that, after a prolonged period of peace with neighbouring nations, the rivalry and competition for supremacy between various sections of a community become embittered, and often develop into civil war. And, on the other hand, victory over a foreign nation is generally a preventive of civil war, while defeat is the almost certain forerunner of it. The explanation of this fact appears to be simple ; for victory brings prosperity, and while that prosperity lasts the cause of civil war is removed.

There are those who maintain that as the people obtain greater power they will put a stop to war. But are there any grounds for such a belief ? Certainly not if there is any truth in the conception that the chief cause of war is the self-interest or the struggle of

communities to exist. The Athenian democracy was by no means averse to war if anything—the property of its neighbours—was to be gained by it. There never was such an unscrupulous overlord as the Athenian democracy. It preached freedom, but it enslaved the people of its dependencies, taxing and bleeding them to the uttermost, utterly regardless of right or wrong, considering its own immediate interests only. The Roman Republic was the most warlike nation of the world, and, as we have seen, was by no means content with the conquest of Italy, but wiped from existence its great rival, the Carthaginians. The English Parliament, “the Rump,” having triumphed over the king, did not hesitate to declare war against the Dutch, in the hope—as some historians say—that the expected naval victories would throw into the shade the victories of Cromwell and the army, by whom its supremacy was threatened. The watchword of the French Republic, “Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality,” was very quickly transformed into a war-cry. Even the great champions of freedom in Great Britain were, in the end, forced to admit that their sympathies with the struggles of the French people had been misplaced. The numerous Italian republics were at constant war. Genoa reduced its rival, Pisa, to impotence, and, itself, fell before Venice.

There seems no reason to believe that a world of democracies will prove less warlike than the world as constituted in the present or in the past. The

reverse is, indeed, the case, inasmuch as nations will be more easily moved by popular excitement. To urge that the French Republic and the British and American democracies are eminently peaceful is no argument, for these nations, at present, find ample scope for their energies. But when the Panama Canal is completed, will the United States permit Great Britain to retain her present possessions in the West Indies without an appeal, if necessary, to force?

But let us regard facts as they are. Is a world of democracies probable in the near future? It is still doubtful that the Russian revolution will succeed, or that the people will gain the upper hand.¹ In Germany, a great and successful revolution alone can place the supreme power in the hands of the people; and, moreover, there seems no particular desire on the part of the people to assume the supreme power. The present ruling classes in Germany have organised the whole nation as a machine of war, and will probably hold their own, not only against the Socialists, but against a world of democracies. German Socialists themselves admit that a revolution in the country is impossible.

It is thus the case that, even though it were true that war would cease in a world of democracies, yet

¹ It is noticeable that the era of assassination has recommenced in Russia. "Atrocities" are to revolution as guerilla is to organised warfare. An established government is seldom overturned by such means.

it seems probable that that happy consummation could only be arrived at through a sea of blood. For if all the nations of Europe and America were democracies, they must yet impose their will on Asia—on China, Japan, and Turkey—by war. Or, if they fail to do so, and prefer to turn their swords into reaping-hooks, there would then exist the danger that a great wave of unchecked invasion might sweep over unwarlike Europe and America.

There are, again, those who argue that the great size of modern armaments is a direct incentive to war—a contention which, if history speaks true, is quite untenable. As far back as the sixth century the Lombards and Romans sought to “enjoy what they already possessed,” and, with that object in view, agreed to lay down their arms. They were, nevertheless, at war with one another within a few years; and the Lombards were destroyed about two hundred years later by the French under Pepin. During two or three centuries in the Middle Ages, Europe passed through a period in which regular armaments were unknown; war was, however, of constant occurrence; and the whole of Central Europe and Italy fell into the grip of mercenary bands—the most terrible page of European history. Since the time of the Lombards there have been many attempts to check the growth of armaments; they have all failed; and have generally been the immediate precursor of war. A suggestion to disarm has, indeed, very often been but the cloak for some sinister

design ; and it is, consequently, justly regarded, to-day, on all sides, with grave suspicion.

The student will find in history but little, if any, evidence to show that a nation has ever been saved from destruction by the obvious and direct intervention of Providence ; and neither will he find a case in which righteousness, unsupported by force, has triumphed in war, or even enabled a people to live at peace with its neighbours. There is, however, one notable instance of an eminently righteous action which, there is good reason to believe, plunged a nation, not only into the horrors of war, but of defeat. Saint Louis of France, acting in the conviction that his predecessor had wrongfully seized the possessions of the English king in France, restored those possessions to Henry III of England.¹ Edward III of England, in putting forward his pretensions to the French throne, was, undoubtedly, influenced by a consideration of the large territories in France, of which he was the overlord. He, and his successors, moreover, utilised these possessions as a base of operations ; and for a hundred years the French people were reduced to the utmost misery by the incursions and conquests of the English. The belief that Saint Louis of France would receive a reward for his benevolence, or that Edward III, the pattern of chivalry, was destined to suffer punishment for his crime, in the world to come, can have afforded little, if any, consolation to the French people of that period.

¹ See Hallam.

We may, perhaps, with advantage quote a notable instance in which the weak was trodden underfoot by the strong, and in which Providence stood aloof and—so far as we can see—made not the smallest attempt to intervene.

The Emperor Charles VI of Germany, seeking to ensure the succession at his death of a female heir, Maria Theresa, purchased at great cost the consent of the powers of Europe to his designs.¹ He trusted to the good faith of these powers, and neglected his armed forces. At his death, Frederick the Great of Prussia, who possessed the finest army in Europe, in which he had complete confidence, immediately seized Silesia. The neighbouring powers, France, Spain, Bavaria, and Saxony, forgetting their engagements, seeing only the weakness of Maria Theresa, and the strength of Frederick, immediately joined in an attack upon Austria. Frederick the Great, having achieved his desire, secretly threw over his allies, making a private compact with Austria, and engaging to stand neutral in consideration of the cession of Lower Silesia. To his astonishment, however, the allies defeated the Austrians without his assistance, capturing Prague. He thereupon denied all knowledge of the secret compact and invaded Moravia. Maria Theresa, however, displayed the highest courage, and her newly raised armies more than held their own. England also intervened with diplomacy, seeking to bring about peace between Frederick and the Austrians in order

¹ The Pragmatic Sanction.

that the latter might turn their full attention to France. Frederick emerged from the struggle master of the whole of Silesia.

There is no sign that Providence concerned itself in the slightest degree with this unprovoked and unchivalrous attack upon an unfortunate princess. It is true that a coalition was afterwards formed against Frederick, and that Prussia was brought to the brink of ruin ; but Frederick, nevertheless, emerged the ultimate victor, and never relaxed his grip on Silesia. Providence may, indeed, be said to have sided with Frederick rather than with the deeply wronged princess ; for in 1762, when the fortunes of Frederick were reduced to their lowest ebb, Elizabeth, the Czarina of Russia, his bitter foe, died, making way for the hero-worshipper, Peter III, who not only concluded peace with Frederick, but restored to him, without indemnity, the country east of the Oder which had been conquered by the Russian armies during the war.

Frederick the Great and Catharine of Russia agreed to promote anarchy in Poland. Their intrigue was crowned with success, and a few years later occurred the first partition of that country. A similar course was adopted as regards Sweden ; but, fortunately for that country, the state of anarchy was brought to a close by the *coup d'état* executed by Gustavus III. It may be that in 1806 Providence punished Prussia for the unscrupulous actions of Frederick the Great, and there are those who argue that his system led directly

to the downfall ; but, in that case, it will be admitted that the chastisement was long deferred ; that it fell on the innocent ; and that it might have been avoided if the nation had displayed greater military efficiency, and if its rulers had displayed the same high standard of leadership, practical if unscrupulous, as that which distinguished Frederick the Great.

There is an overwhelming mass of evidence which tends to show that the existence of nations is dependent on force alone, that is, on warlike efficiency ; and that when a nation has been destroyed, it has suffered defeat owing to an obvious insufficiency of force, or to an equally obvious misapplication of its available force. The very expression, so commonly used, the balance of power, shows that this fact is very generally appreciated throughout the modern world ; for balance of power means, evidently, balance of force. The view that the safety of a nation is assured by divine protection appears to be utterly opposed to the teaching of history. It may yet be, however, that the old adage of the ancients is correct, and that "those whom the gods wish to destroy they first dement," is true. In that case, the madness invariably takes the form of unreadiness for war, of discord in place of unity of purpose, of a false conception of war, and, above all, of unscientific national leadership.

But, it will be said, such a conception of war, though it may be in accordance with the teaching of history, is yet utterly opposed to the teaching of Christianity.

It may be so ; but yet it will be admitted by all that the relation of Christianity to war is a vast and, at present, an insoluble problem. Is not this science of war one of the riddles of the universe—the great riddle of the universe—on the study of which the great scientists of the past fifty years have been engaged ? Is it not closely connected with the problem of the origin of life ? Is not war all around us, in our very blood, a part of our being ? It is not a problem to be dogmatically solved in accordance with preconceived notions, to be put lightly aside with the apparently unfounded statement that war is “wicked.”

But, again, it will be said, if war is due to self-interest, we Christians have no choice but to stigmatise it as wicked. But let us look at facts as they are, not as we would wish them to be. In the times of the Crusades,¹ the Pope and the Sultan of the Saracens held up practically the same inducements to their warriors, Christians and Mohammedans. The soldier was told that, if he fought for his faith, he would enjoy eternal happiness hereafter ; that, in addition, if he fought bravely, he might win material rewards in this world, that he might carve out a principality for himself with his sword, that he might win wealth. Each leader absolved his followers of their debts, while the Pope, at least, gave absolution for crimes. The Mohammedan leader drew attention to the beauty of the houris in Paradise ; the Pope pointed significantly to the beauty of the Grecian women.

¹ See Gibbon.

It was not altogether a high ideal that induced the bulk of the Crusaders and Mohammedans to fight bravely. It may, however, be argued that the Popes themselves were actuated by the highest motives, though the means they employed were not entirely above reproach. But then, again, we find that large numbers of the more fanatical Christian devotees poured their wealth into the lap of the Church; that the sale of absolutions was a source of vast profit to the Church; that by the Crusades the fighting men were withdrawn from Europe; and that the Church was left in possession, not only of all the wealth, but of the undisputed supremacy, throughout Europe. There is no reason to believe, if we study the history of the rise to supremacy of the Church in detail, that the Popes were blind to the material advantages they would themselves gain by the Crusades. Or, again, it will be said, that surely those fanatical devotees who cast away their wealth and material interests in this world, who cast away even their lives—surely, they were actuated by a high ideal? They cast away their lives in search of a heavenly crown and of eternal happiness hereafter. All religions are, after all, in their fundamental aspects, based on self-interest. So also—curious anomaly that it is—is patriotism, or the spirit of self-sacrifice for the good of the community. Its display is merely an essential measure of self-defence.

It will be seen that the study of war leads us into very deep waters. But are we, therefore, because this

riddle is insoluble to our limited understanding, to disregard the patent facts from history which stare us in the face ; are we to stake the future of our country, the well-being, or the very lives, of our women-folk and children, on what may prove to be a false conception ? Are we, then, ourselves children that we should shudder and turn aside from the contemplation of unpleasant, or even horrible, facts ? It will surely be small consolation to us in the moment of defeat to believe that our wicked and unscrupulous enemy is doomed to receive heavy punishment two to three hundred years hence in this world, and that his criminal leaders will suffer in the world to come. It would be wiser in us to recognise that the unscrupulous nation has generally gained success in this world, has won comfort, luxury, and satisfied its ambition.

If we are to judge from history, it is war and readiness for war, which keep nations mentally and physically vigorous ; without these all progress ceases. It is difficult, if not impossible, to find a case of a vigorous, thoroughly efficient, up-to-date, and progressive nation which has suffered defeat in war ; except it be a petty community which has been overwhelmed and absorbed by a vigorous and powerful neighbour.

Let us hear what Ruskin has to say on the matter. "I found, in brief," he writes, "that all great nations learned their truth of word, and strength of thought, in war ; that they were nourished in war, and wasted by peace ; taught by war, and deceived by peace ;

trained by war, and betrayed by peace ; in a word, that they were born in war, and expired in peace."

It may be that the Almighty raised Alexander the Great to destroy the Persians ; that he brought Napoleon into this world, trained him, and used him as a weapon, with some definite purpose in view. But is it then impious in us to point out that all evidence tends to show that this object is progress, and the destruction of the unprogressive nations ?

A British orator has lately held up to us "Peace, progress, and culture" as the aim of our national endeavour. It is a high-sounding phrase and a beautiful ideal, but, like many such, it disregards the stern realities of life. For peace is, as all history tells us, possible only with a perfect balance of force ; progress is the child of competition, which apparently, so far as nations are concerned, is war ; while culture is, as history again tells us, the first and most direct result of war, due probably to the vast energy engendered by the effort to win, and which, after victory, seeks an outlet in literature, the arts, sciences, and invention. "Hence," writes Machiavelli, "wise men have observed that the age of literary excellence is subsequent to that of distinction in arms, and that in cities and provinces great warriors are produced before philosophers." And more than this, national prosperity, as well as general progress, follows hard on the heels of victory—as witness the German nation at the present day—while all these—progress, culture, and prosperity—very often dis-

appear with defeat. As notable examples, we may mention the Athenians and the Poles, the Dutch after their successful rebellion against the Spaniards, and the British after the Napoleonic wars ; but it is true of all nations.

It may be that future generations will solve the great riddle of war, the relation of religion to war and of war to life ; but, in the meantime, let us face fearlessly the fact that all nations of the past have been destroyed by war ; that it is but a fair inference that nations of the present and future will meet their doom through the same agency ; and that weakness in a nation, whatsoever its cause, is a certain precursor of attack. This war is a fearful thing which passes the bounds of our comprehension—a thing of divine origin, a terrible weapon employed, possibly—who knows?—to ensure that nations and mankind shall display efficiency and make progress, or cease to exist. We, with our limited understanding, cannot fathom the designs of the Almighty ; we cannot solve the riddles of the universe ; we can merely assert that such riddles exist, and scratch at the surface of them. Nay, we can do more ; we can study history, we can use our intelligence, we can seek to ascertain the means by which nations have won victory in the past, and we can infer the means by which nations may win victory in the future. We can also say that war, that is the period of hostilities, appears to be the decisive phase in the national struggle for existence, and that it is by victory alone that a nation can

establish its right to exist. If these facts could be faced fearlessly by all men, if the forces of the world could be neatly balanced, if all nations could at all times be in constant readiness for war, could render themselves thoroughly efficient, and devote their whole attention to true scientific progress, then, indeed, the day of universal peace might be at hand, except for that eternal and unceasing struggle between rich and poor. But here, again, it is the balance of force which averts open class warfare. Peace is the result of fear.

Having regard to the fact that nations of the world have all succumbed to force, let us turn to the consideration of what it is that constitutes this force, and the manner in which it should be scientifically applied.

CHAPTER II

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUCCESS IN WAR

The composition of force—The application of force—Examples—Sudden and unexpected concentration—Surprise, secrecy, rapidity—Necessity for organisation and preparation in peace time—The application of overpowering force at a vital point the principle of success in theatre of hostilities or on the battlefield—Is it also applicable to national strategy?—Offensive and defensive—Examples—Morally aggressive war—Examples—Principle of success holds good of national strategy—Unscrupulous nations—National virtues—Chances of national success in war may be gauged.

“**F**ORCE” in war has been divided into moral and physical. Clausewitz tells us that the moral powers “are the Talents of the Commander ; the Military Virtue of the Army ; its National feeling.” Colonel Henderson, in *The Science of War*, describes moral force as “that almost indefinable force which Napoleon declared was as to the physical, that is to numbers, armament, and physique, as three to one.” And again he writes that moral force “is the art of trading on the fears and susceptibilities of the opponent ; that it lies in the power of a general to see deep into the mind of the hostile leader, to realise that leader’s weaknesses, to take advantage of them, and to upset his mental equilibrium. But surely, then, this moral force is principally the skill of the leader, that is, the application of force. Let us, there-

fore, first consider the composition of physical force, and thereafter the application of it.

The first thing we learn from the study of history is that numbers alone do not constitute force. The wars of Alexander the Great against the Persians, of the Romans, Spaniards, British, French, against barbarians, as well as the history of popular risings, show that armed mobs, even in vastly superior numbers, are perfectly helpless against trained, disciplined, and organised troops. Perhaps the clearest lesson of all is to be found in the later stages of the Franco-German War of 1870-1.

The wars between trained troops and barbarians, between the English and French in the fourteenth century, the war of 1866 between the Prussians and the Austrians, as well as many others—the fight between David and Goliath, for instance—teach the value of a long-range weapon, or of better armament, by means of which the enemy can be practically destroyed before he can come to close quarters.

The wars of Wallenstein and Tilly, the great mercenary leaders, teach that mercenaries will seldom fight to a finish, especially when opposed by patriots; but numerous other wars teach that patriotic or religious enthusiasm are of little value if unaccompanied by discipline, organisation, and training. The religious and patriotic enthusiasm and fanatical courage of the Dervishes, for instance, availed them but little against the highly trained and well-armed forces of Lord Kitchener. Cromwell's Ironsides, however,

show that when all these qualities are combined, the result is the production of a very powerful force, which is, indeed, almost invulnerable except against a force superior in these qualities and more scientifically applied. We have another example of this fact in the Swiss infantry of the Middle Ages. They were noted for their discipline and training as well as for their patriotism; any man who fled from the battlefield suffered death by the law of the land at the hands of the public executioner. But many wars, again, teach that numbers are by no means unimportant. Nelson says, "Numbers only can annihilate"; while Clausewitz asserts that Napoleon, in spite of his genius, could never win a battle against double his own numbers of European troops. Hannibal could defeat vastly superior numbers in the field, but he could never strike a death-blow at Rome itself for lack of men. When he menaced the city, every man and boy capable of bearing arms crowded to the walls for its defence. His troops were mercenaries, and his government would not keep him supplied with reinforcements.

The history of all war shows that battles are won by troops who will march deliberately and enthusiastically to what appears to be certain death, who are also well organised and well disciplined, and whose armament and training are up to date. Modern wars merely teach the same lesson as ancient wars; and the clearest illustration of all is given by the Japanese, whose spirit has been aptly described as "scientific

fanaticism." Physical force is made up, primarily, of the martial qualities, discipline, organisation, training, armament ; and, if to these, patriotic or religious enthusiasm be added, the force is vastly increased. When the martial qualities, armament, and leadership are equal, numbers become decisive ; and where superiority in numbers, in armament, and in the martial qualities exists, victory follows almost as a matter of course if the force be scientifically applied.

But superiority in numbers and in the martial qualities are quite useless unless the leadership, that is, the education, not only of the chief, but of all the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks, is of a high order. With good leadership, all things are possible—with bad, nothing is possible. For the good leader will quickly inculcate the martial qualities into the forces under his control. With a bad leader, however, even discipline is impossible ; for every capable subordinate will very soon appreciate at its full significance the incapacity of his chief. Ignorance or incapacity are apt to arouse not merely pity, but contempt ; and either of these sentiments in a subordinate is quite inconsistent with true discipline. A grave reduction of force is the immediate result of the slightest lack of discipline, or any one of the martial qualities. All these martial qualities, indeed, are intimately connected one with the other ; and a deficiency in any one will involve a corresponding deficiency in the others. But of all these, the education of the officers is of far the most importance.

For on it depends the courage and individual intelligence of the men, the power of initiative on the part of subordinates, the power to trust subordinates on the part of superiors, and the intelligent co-operation between the various infinitesimal parts of the machine. The happy conjunction of the martial qualities and of a thorough military education, forms the groundwork of a general and well-justified feeling of confidence throughout all ranks, which is known as the military spirit, or military virtue, of an armed force; and the possession of which is a vital element of success. It is, indeed, the vital point of any armed force; and once this spirit is broken down, an army or a navy becomes a demoralised rabble, which is powerless. It is to rousing this spirit in his own force, and to the destruction of it in that of the enemy, that the great leader invariably turns his first attention. If he can outwit the hostile leader, and "upset his mental equilibrium," his purpose is more than half achieved; for the military spirit is born in the capacity and self-confidence of the chief. If that self-confidence is misplaced, the military spirit is a false sentiment, which gives way at the first shock to hopeless despondency. It is then that an armed force lies at the mercy of its foe.

And thus it is that, in a consideration of the education of the officers and of the military spirit, we come naturally to the question of leadership, and so, to the application of force; for the application of force is the province of leadership. And as

Colonel Henderson writes, "it should never be forgotten that success depends far more on the skill of the general than on the efficiency of the troops"; or, in other words, that victory depends far more on the application of force than on the constitution of it. Napoleon, as has been seen, gives us the ratio as three to one.

In our study of the application of force, we cannot do better, in the first instance, than quote Colonel Henderson. "War," he writes, "is no exact science; it has no fixed code of rules. All that can be said is that there is one good working principle—the concentration of superior force at the decisive point—which, if applied, will generally bring about success; and a good many others which it is risky, but not necessarily fatal, to infringe." And again, "There are certain principles which serve as guides; and it will be seen that they are all accessory to a rule of strategy which is intimately connected with that which bids us strike at the enemy's communications, viz. *the concentration of superior strength, physical and moral, on the field of battle.*"

In the period of Spartan supremacy, opposing armies marched against each other in a line formation, twelve to sixteen men deep. It was, at that time, a rule of war. Epaminondas, the Theban general, at the battle of Leuctra, breaking through this rule, strengthened his left wing to fifty men deep at the expense of the rest of his line. His left wing overwhelmed the Spartan right, took the centre in

flank, and the Spartan army was destroyed. From that day to this, sudden and unexpected concentration of force at a vital point—the enemy's attention having been attracted elsewhere by false information, demonstrations, and feints at vulnerable points—has been the method adopted by all the great leaders of history. Thus the apparent vulnerability of Napoleon's line of communication at Austerlitz, and of Wellington's at Salamanca, induced the enemy to separate his forces. Of this separation instant advantage was taken, one portion of the enemy being overwhelmed before the other could come to its assistance.

Napoleon, in the Waterloo campaign, seeking to defeat the allied armies separately, and therefore to strike with his whole available force at the decisive point, the point of junction, diverted Wellington's attention from that point by false information and feints directed at the vulnerable line of communication of the British army. He thus induced Wellington to delay his concentration, and thereby gained time for his attack on the Prussians. The sudden concentration of the allied armies on the field of Waterloo, however, came as an entire surprise to Napoleon, and hence, probably, his destruction.

The sudden and unexpected rush of 10,000 to 13,000 Athenians drove over 100,000 Persians in utter panic to their ships at Marathon. The sudden and unexpected attack of Cromwell on the Royalist right at Marston Moor assured the defeat of the

Royalists and the ultimate triumph of the Parliamentarians. The sudden and unexpected onslaught of the Japanese on the Russian right at Mukden—the attention of the Russian general having previously been drawn to his left—would probably have resulted in the utter defeat of the latter had the former possessed sufficient cavalry. It was the sudden and unexpected counterstroke of the English at Poitiers which destroyed the French army. It was Frederick the Great's unexpected onslaught which destroyed the French army at Rossbach. It was Nelson's unexpected hardihood at Aboukir Bay which placed the French fleet at his mercy—and the same is true of Copenhagen.

As a notable example of the misapplication of an overwhelmingly powerful force we may mention the Spanish Armada. Philip II of Spain tied the hands of his admiral, ordering him to hug the French coast and to avoid an engagement until he had formed a junction with Parma in the harbours of the Netherlands. The Spanish admiral, arriving at the entrance of the English Channel, found that the English were unaware of his approach, that their fleet was scattered in the Channel ports, and that he was given an opportunity to destroy that portion of it which was in Plymouth Sound. He decided—probably on the recommendation of his subordinates—to attack and destroy the English detachment in Plymouth. But, on approaching Plymouth, he found that the English, having been

warned, were coming out to meet him. His master's orders now recurred to his recollection, and he turned and made for the French coast, seeking to avoid an engagement. For seven days the Spanish fleet, constantly attacked and harried, but refusing to fight, progressed up-channel towards the point of concentration. Its rearmost ships—the slowest sailers—bore the brunt of the whole force of the English and Dutch, who received constant reinforcements from every English port. On arrival at the Downs, the Spaniards had suffered heavily, without having inflicted any punishment on their enemies. They were demoralised; their enemies proportionately elated. A sudden night attack by fireships completed their discomfiture; and at dawn, scattered and helpless in face of their enemy, they were driven past the point of concentration into the North Sea.

There seems no reason to doubt that if Medina-Sidonia had carried out his first plan and attacked with his whole force the English detachment as it issued from Plymouth, that he would have destroyed the English and Dutch fleets piecemeal, and enabled Parma to effect the invasion and easy conquest of England. But no military spirit can withstand constant belabouring without an attempt to return the blows.

This principle of success applies equally to strategy. Napoleon's combination which resulted in Trafalgar would almost certainly have succeeded had he possessed in Villeneuve a leader of high capacity. His

marches to Marengo, to Jena, and to Ulm are illustrations of this principle. Wellington's passage of the Douro, his construction of the lines of Torres Vedras, his unexpected assaults on the fortresses of Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, his converging attacks at Vittoria, similarly illustrate this principle. Hannibal's unexpected offensive from Spain into Italy, the sudden attack on the Russian fleet in Port Arthur, the seizure of Seoul, and the passage of the Yalu by the Japanese—these merely illustrate the same lesson, and prove that sudden and unexpected concentration of force has been the feature of the operations of all great leaders since time immemorial.

Surprise is the essence of success; for it is not only calculated to upset the mental equilibrium of the hostile commander, but to temporarily destroy discipline and to dislocate all organisation, that is, to reduce an armed force to an armed mob. But if the opponent learns of the projected concentration, he will naturally take steps to meet it, or to inflict a crushing counterstroke elsewhere. Surprise depends on secrecy in preparation and rapidity in execution. Secrecy can only be attained by the suppression of the hostile system of espionage, which requires an organisation for the purpose; and by the strictest discipline not only in the army or navy, but in the nation at large. Rapidity in execution, that is, mobility, also depends on education, discipline, organisation, and training. And closely connected with this question of surprise is the acquirement of information respecting

the enemy's movements and intentions. The leader works, so to speak, in the dark, which is only illuminated by his own genius. He has a foundation of certain authenticated facts on which to base his calculations and form his plans; from this foundation he infers other facts, he must divine his enemy's intentions, he acts on probabilities. The more authenticated facts that are placed at his disposal, the more rapidly and easily will he be able to make his plans and to put his designs into execution. But in order to discover the enemy's intentions and preparations, and in order to circulate false information by means of which the enemy shall be misled, an organisation for the purpose is necessary.

Hence it is that all great leaders of history have sought to inculcate the martial qualities and to organise in peace time, or as soon as possible after the outbreak of hostilities. Philip of Macedon, learning from Epaminondas, organised and trained the Macedonian phalanx, by means of which he conquered Greece; his son, Alexander the Great, with the same weapon, conquered the whole known world. Hamilcar, the Carthaginian general, established a base of operations in Spain and organised and trained an army; with this weapon, and from this base, his son Hannibal struck at Rome. Gustavus Adolphus and Frederick the Great both found organised and trained armies ready to their hand; their victories were due to forethought and preparation as much as to their masterly leadership. For the point is, that,

without their preparation, their masterly leadership would have been impossible. Both of these two leaders, like all others, depended on the manœuvring capacity of their troops. Thus Frederick the Great manœuvred on the battlefield, and threw his whole weight against the weakest point of his adversary. Gustavus Adolphus trained his cavalry to charge at a gallop instead of a walk, to pin their faith to the sabre instead of to the pistol; he also organised his army in smaller units, and thus gained, not only greater mobility, but a greater number of brains to think for, to assist him, and to act on their own initiative in emergencies. He improved his artillery, and trained his gunners until they could fire two shots to the enemy's one. He trained his troops to combined action, placing small bodies of infantry amongst his cavalry, in order that if his cavalry met with defeat they should find a sure support and rallying-point behind these infantry squares. Nelson's victories were in great part due to the state of extraordinary efficiency into which Sir John Jervis had brought the British navy, though the instruction he, himself, imparted to his captains may well have been the primary cause.

Cromwell, Marlborough, William of Orange, Wellington, Napoleon, Jervis, Nelson, Lee, Jackson, Grant, and Sherman were obliged by stress of circumstances to train their armies and navies in time of war; but can any man doubt that they would have preferred to train them in peace time if it had been possible?

We may safely assert that all great leaders of history have fully recognised that the application of overpowering force at a vital point of the enemy is the one true principle of success on the battlefield or in the theatre of hostilities, and that they have, one and all, sought to put it into effect. When possible, they have endeavoured to prepare the force in peace time, and have left no stone unturned to inculcate the martial qualities, to rouse the enthusiasm and military spirit of their men, to give them confidence and to increase their own prestige. It is, probably, with a view to this latter point that the great leaders have so often claimed the protection of the Almighty, so often assured their men that in case of death on the battlefield they will win eternal happiness. The enthusiastic Maid of Orleans, claiming to be the *protégée* of Heaven, and infusing her own spirit into her countrymen, worked on the superstition of the English, and struck a shrewd blow at the military spirit of her enemies. Alexander the Great undertook an expedition into the Libyan Desert in order to oblige the priests of Ammon to recognise, and proclaim, him to be the son of Zeus and the predestined ruler of the world. It is undoubtedly with a view to enhancing their prestige and thereby strengthening their position that kings have claimed a "divine right" to rule. It was probably with this object in view that the Mahdi claimed to be the appointed of the Prophet; and it is quite possible that Cromwell, in his innermost soul, recognised the

material advantages to be gained if his men could be induced to believe that he was fighting the battles of heaven. There is no reason to stigmatise these leaders as hypocrites, for in all probability they themselves firmly believed in that divine protection they claimed. Napoleon was a firm believer in his "star," and it is a well-known trait of human nature that the man who seeks to teach must first convince himself of the truth of his teaching.

All soldiers and sailors of to-day—some unconsciously, perhaps—recognise the truth of the principle of success in war—the application of overpowering force at a vital point; for are not all our efforts directed to the inculcation of the martial qualities into our subordinates, and to the study of the means whereby force is to be applied, either on the battlefield, or in the theatre of hostilities? The selection and fortification of positions and "zones of manœuvre" by means of which the enemy shall be placed at a disadvantage, the sudden and unexpected counterstroke, the combined action of the three arms, the concentration of fire—what are these but the application of force? Modern nations, with some few exceptions, have, moreover, formed themselves into machines of war, pure and simple. They not only train their leaders, but ensure that the weapons with which those leaders must fight shall be as efficient and perfect as care and forethought can make them.

Bearing this last well-known fact in mind, let us ask

ourselves, does this principle apply equally to the success of nations in the struggle for existence? Is there such a thing as national strategy, that is, the application of the national force? Are nations forces which are liable to destruction if their strength, moral or physical, be insufficient, that is, if the leadership be unscientific, or if the people lack education and the martial qualities?

There is a well-known maxim—offence is the only safe defence—which has been held to be true by every great leader of history, as well as by every student of war. It has generally been limited, however, to the strategy of the theatre of hostilities, or to the tactics of the battlefield; but, nevertheless, it undoubtedly holds true of the application of force by nations. Colonel Henderson writes: "Treaties of peace are only signed within sight of an enemy's capital." And again: "A nation endures with comparative equanimity defeat beyond its own borders. Pride and prestige may suffer, but a high-spirited people will seldom be brought to the point of making terms unless its army is annihilated in the heart of its own country, unless the capital is occupied and the hideous sufferings of war are brought directly home to the mass of the population."¹

Captain Mahan writes: "And it must be added as a received military axiom that war, however defensive in moral character, must be waged aggressively if it is to hope for success." And again: "In the matter of

¹ *Stonewall Jackson.*

preparation for war, one clear idea should be absorbed first by every one who, recognising that war is still a possibility, desires to see his country ready. This idea is that, however defensive in origin or political character a war may be, the assumption of a simple defensive in war is ruin. War, once declared, must be waged offensively, aggressively. The enemy must not be fended off, but smitten down. You may then spare him every exaction, relinquish every gain; but till down he must be struck incessantly and remorselessly."¹

Clausewitz, on the other hand, asserts that the defensive is "the stronger form of war"; and it is undoubtedly the case that a nation which fights in defence of its possessions, which seeks to repel aggression, displays greater unanimity of purpose, and therefore greater power. Thus the war which is defensive in its moral character is the stronger form of war, provided the initiative and the power to strike the first blow are not handed over to the enemy. It would seem, however, that the strongest form of war is that which is aggressive both in its moral character and in its conduct, provided the aggressive motive be disguised; for aggressive designs permit of preparation on scientific principles. Such a conception of war is, however, designated as utterly unscrupulous—on a plane with the poisoning of wells, or the murder of prisoners. If, however, we can imagine a nation with criminal tendencies, we then see that

¹ *The Interest of America in Sea Power.*

such a form of war, which is of a powerful nature, and is likely to be successful, would strongly appeal to it.

But however that may be, there is a general consensus of opinion that "war must be waged aggressively, offensively." For Clausewitz himself by no means takes an opposite view, for he writes: "A war in which victories are merely used to ward off blows, and where there is no attempt to return the blow, would be just as absurd as a battle in which the most absolute defence (passivity) should everywhere prevail in all measures."

If we admit that the application of overpowering force at a vital point is the one true principle of success in war between nations, then we can understand that an offensive is essential to success; but if, on the other hand, we refuse to admit this principle, then we cannot understand the reason for the above generally accepted maxim. For the application of force at a vital point of an enemy implies a movement towards that enemy, that is, an offensive. And, vice versa, without an offensive movement, it is evidently impossible to apply overpowering force at a vital point, that is, it is impossible to put into practice the one true principle of success in war, and defeat must be the inevitable result. If we turn to history, we find that no nation which has adopted an attitude of passive defence has ever won wars, unless it has obtained the services of allies to strike for it.

Julius Cæsar, shortly before his assassination, was engaged in the study of the problem of Imperial

Defence. He decided to assume the offensive against the barbarians on the northern frontiers of the empire, taking the Parthians and Scythians to the east first, and the Germans to the west afterwards. He was killed, however, before he could put his plans into execution. Augustus Cæsar reversed his policy, or rather, strategy, and elected to stand on the passive defensive. He fortified the frontiers, and maintained armies for the defence of those frontiers. His line of strategy was, with one small interlude, followed up to the last days of the Roman Empire. The barbarians, in the course of many centuries, increased and multiplied, constantly surging against the frontiers, until finally, like a pent-up sea, they burst their barriers, flooding and swelling into every cranny and crevice of the western empire. And these were mere barbarians. How if they had been vigorous and up-to-date nations?—How much the sooner would the Roman Empire have fallen?

Henry IV and Richelieu both considered that an offensive against the House of Hapsburg was the sole means by which the independence of France could be assured. Richelieu deliberately formed a plan of campaign which was systematically followed, and which left France almost supreme in Europe. His plan was to suppress all discord and dissension in France, that is, to destroy the power of the nobility and of the Huguenots, and to make the king supreme; to weaken the House of Hapsburg to the utmost by intrigue or fraud, as well as by utilising the North

German Protestants and Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden ; and finally, when France was ready, to strike a death-blow. It was only towards the latter end of the Thirty Years War that France struck in with decisive effect, and ensured her own ascendancy by leaving Germany a prey to hopeless discord and disunion. Louis XIV afterwards carried on his national strategy on similar principles, and, making his preparations, deliberately attempted to seize the Netherlands. His failure was due to the fact that, at the very moment when he had the Netherlands at his feet, he failed to move rapidly and to strike the decisive blow ; he granted his enemies time ; a coalition was formed against him ; and he was, finally, obliged to relinquish the offensive and to defend himself.

Gustavus Adolphus recognised that a defensive attitude against the House of Hapsburg must prove fatal to the independence of Sweden. He therefore made preparation and assumed the offensive into Germany. Frederick the Great, when confronted by an alliance between Austria, Prussia, and France, did not hesitate, but instantly assumed the offensive. That certain modern nations will, if necessary, act as did Cyrus the Persian and Frederick the Great seems evident from the late Morocco question between Germany and France. There are two possible explanations of this affair. The first, that Germany sought occasion to strike down France while Russia, the ally of the latter, was helpless ; and was only restrained by the warning that Great Britain would

assist France. And the second explanation is that Germany, in doubt whether the *entente cordiale* was an alliance directed against herself, sought to ascertain the truth by a threat against France, with a view to the delivery of an actual blow before Great Britain was ready, if there was found to be just cause for apprehension. The latter is the most charitable explanation; the former is probably the true one. But whichever of these is correct, the underlying principle is the same. For the policy which consists in striking down one adversary before another probable adversary can be fully prepared is identical with the operation, so well known in strategy, which utilises the interior lines of operation; the essence of both is time.—Can one hostile force be destroyed before another can come to its assistance?

There are throughout history numerous instances of war, aggressive in moral character and conducted offensively, which have been eminently successful. The Protestant prince, Prince Maurice of Saxe, while secretly preparing for hostilities, pretended the utmost friendship for his old master and chief, Charles V, Emperor of Germany; he then suddenly threw off the mask, and by a rapid advance nearly succeeded in seizing the person of the emperor. Protestants will, however, maintain that his action was defensive in moral character; but Catholics, on the other hand, will maintain that it was aggressive. As to the deceitful nature of his proceedings there can be no doubt.

Frederick the Great of Prussia, having made his preparations with extreme secrecy, deliberately took advantage of the death of the emperor, and of the weakness of Austria owing to the accession of a princess, and seized Silesia. The attack by the Prussians and Austrians on the Danes was distinctly aggressive in its moral character. The Prussians, having made preparation, attacked Austria in 1866, throwing the onus on to their enemy. Their war against France in 1870 was conducted on similar principles; Prussia, or the present German Empire, may, in fact, be termed the exponent of war, aggressive in its moral character, conducted offensively, and crowned with complete success. Lately published memoirs and biographies give no reason to believe that its future wars will be conducted by methods less promising, if less unscrupulous, than those by means of which it has won the leading place in the continent of Europe. As is well known, their conception of war, and the methods by which victory may be won, are based on the writings of Clausewitz; it seems possible that some final chapters of his great work on war are in existence which have, nevertheless, never been published.

The Boers give us another example of a morally aggressive war in which the onus was thrown on to the enemy; it failed owing to the military inefficiency of the nation.

In the mediæval wars between England and France the English sought to break down the French power

by the invasion of French territory, the destruction of the French forces, and the conquest of the country. Their action was, without doubt, morally aggressive. In the wars between these two nations, in the time of Louis XIV, England resisted the aggressive designs of the French on the Netherlands, in the conviction that a French domination of the Dutch harbours must constitute a serious menace to the British power. Her action was consequently defensive in moral character. As her possessions increased, and her empire became extended, her wars became more defensive in moral character; the French seized the initiative and became morally aggressive. In the war of American independence, France, having made careful preparation, struck in at the opportune moment, and Great Britain was brought to the verge of destruction. It is possible that she owed her ultimate escape to the French Revolution, which not only reduced France to anarchy, but ruined the power of the French navy.

Napoleon's wars were, in the first instance, aggressive in moral character; afterwards they became defensive—the only means by which he could maintain his position. He defended himself by offensive strokes, seeking to separate and destroy his adversaries in turn. When, through lack of resources—after his great disaster in Russia—he failed to maintain his offensive attitude, he succumbed to the attack of the continental powers.

The late war between Russia and Japan affords an interesting study in this connexion. It seems probable

CHAPTER VII

BATTLES OF TANNENBERG AND THE MASURIAN LAKES

TANNENBERG. (MAP VIII.)

The situation confronting Hindenburg and Ludendorff when they took over command of the Eighth Army in East Prussia on 23rd August was as bad as it could be.

Rennenkampf's Nyeman Army, including II Corps, was advancing west from the line Goldap—Gumbinnen—Pilkallen on a front of some 40 miles with a total strength of eleven divisions and five cavalry divisions. The main body of the Eighth Army facing them, 3rd Reserve Division, I Reserve Corps, XVII Corps, I Corps and 1st Cavalry Division, was in retreat towards the outer defences of Konigsberg. Rennenkampf had suffered heavy losses in the battles nearer the frontier.

Samsonov's Narev Army of nine infantry and three cavalry divisions had reached the line Usdau—Waplitzen and was opposed by the XX Corps with a Landwehr Brigade and some garrison troops from the Vistula fortresses. These German troops had had very severe fighting. The area of the Masurian Lakes, Nikolaiken—Lotzen—Lake Mauer, was well fortified with pill-boxes, trenches and wire and held by the Germans. At Lotzen there was a small "feste" (Fort Boyen) constructed in peace time.

The proposal to retire west of the Vistula had been abandoned by Eighth Army Headquarters and when Hindenburg and Ludendorff took over the intention was to

hold the line of the river Passarge. This withdrawal would of course have permitted Rennenkampf and Samsonov to join hands and their superiority would have been overwhelming. Hitherto their two armies had been operating quite independently and with insufficient co-ordination.

The invasion of East Prussia in such strength by the Russians was certainly an unwelcome surprise. Reinforcements from the west could not be expected even under the most favourable conditions for some weeks. A purely defensive attitude until a decision was reached in the west had been the German intention in their pre-war plans, but this was based on mere theory worked out in war games. When it came to the pinch it was more than the Prussians could stand to have the important province of East Prussia, a hot-bed of Prussianism, overrun by the enemy. This civil pressure weighed heavily with German Supreme Command and undoubtedly also with Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

At all events they made their decision to attack the western Russian Army, Samsonov's, with all available forces, while holding off or rather merely observing Rennenkampf with a small force. In fact, they intended to act on interior lines against each of the separate Russian armies in turn, making the best use of the good communications of East Prussia, and taking advantage of the natural and artificial defences of the theatre of operations; first the line of Masurian Lakes, easily held, and second the outer defences of Königsberg on the line of river Deime. This was a bold decision, one might almost call it rash, but it is not possible to tell how much Ludendorff was influenced by knowledge of the difficulties of Rennenkampf's rearward services in supply, reinforcements, etc., and of the fact that the Commander of the Russian North-West Army Group, Gen. Jilinsky at Warsaw, had hitherto failed completely to co-ordinate the action of the armies under him. Jilinsky's plan was to unite

his two armies about Allenstein and then clear East Prussia, but the mobility of the Germans was far greater than that of the Russians.

During the period 24th to 26th August the following moves took place in the Eighth German Army in accordance with Ludendorff's plan. I call it Ludendorff's plan as there is no doubt that from this time on Ludendorff's was the brain that conceived while Hindenburg was the figure-head on whom the responsibility was placed.

It would appear from a study of the literature on the German railways in the war that westerly moves by rail of 3rd Reserve Division and I Corps were commenced on 21st August under the orders of Prittwitz. The bulk of I Corps were to detrain at Graudenz on the Vistula. On 22nd August Ludendorff was at O.H.L. at Koblenz, passing through on his way to East Prussia. He made his first appreciation of the situation there and then, and fully realizing the high state of organization and good capacity of the East Prussian railways, he diverted I Corps by wire from Koblenz. The traffic was diverted from Marienburg on the Vistula to the Deutsch Eylau area, where detraining was completed at eight detraining stations by the evening of 25th August. 3rd Reserve Division had detrained in the Allenstein area by the evening of 22nd August and then assembled west of Hohenstein, I Corps moved forward through Montowo.

Thus I Corps and 3rd Reserve Division were railed from the main body of Eighth Army to join Von Scholtz's hard-pressed XX Corps. XVII Corps and I Reserve Corps continued their retreat, but on 26th August moved sharply to the south to Bishofsburg and Seeburg. On the same day one cavalry brigade left the 1st Cavalry Division and moved south towards Sensburg. So from 27th to 30th August, the period during which the Battle of Tannenberg was raging, Rennenkampf's army had lost touch with the Germans and was only faced by weak detachments holding

the area of the Masurian Lakes, two cavalry brigades from lake Mauer to river Pregal, and the Königsberg garrison north of river Pregal. During this period Rennenkampf, pivoting on his II Corps at Angerburg, only advanced his other three corps to the line Nordenburg—Allenburg. Two cavalry divisions advanced on the south beyond Lotzen. Lotzen was threatened with bombardment and called on to surrender, but held out. Three cavalry divisions advanced on the north against Königsberg, but were held up on the river Deime. Rennenkampf was completely out of touch with Samsonov, they had no direct communication, also Rennenkampf's slow progress was due to supply and communication difficulties. The German standard-gauge railways could not be used by Russian broad-gauge rolling-stock. But his army was only 50 miles from the battle and it is scarcely conceivable that he could not have sent considerable assistance if he had known the situation. Rennenkampf's ideas on how to pursue a beaten enemy or to press a retiring foe are shown by a remark made to one of his staff after the Battle of Gumbinnen who had gone to bed with his clothes on. He said, "You can take off your clothes now, the Germans are retiring."

The Russian wireless messages sent in clear were of great assistance to the Germans in showing the dispositions of the Russian troops. Samsonov's orders for the moves of his corps on 26th August were picked up by the Germans on the day of issue, the 25th. It is a notable fact that this use of wireless in clear by the Russians went on for about a year and of course made the task of the German Command in the east infinitely easier.

On 26th August the Russian Second Army had reached the following positions: VI Corps, with one cavalry division, on the right—Bishofsburg, XIII Corps between Passenheim and Allenstein, XV and part of XXIII Corps attacking Scholtz on the Hohenstein—Waplitz front, and the I Corps, with two cavalry divisions, on the left,

moving west through Soldau, and also in touch with I German Corps west of Usdau. In fact, the Russian Army was wheeling to its left, pivoting on the XXIII Corps.

Ludendorff's orders were for the southern group of the Eighth Army to attack on 27th August, against the front Usdau—Waplitz—Hohenstein, the I Corps to break through the Russian Army between their I and XXIII Corps in the direction of Neidenburg with the object of driving I Russian Corps south to Soldau and isolating and surrounding the main body of the Russian Second Army. The envelopment to be completed by the I Reserve Corps and XVII corps advancing south through Passenheim—Allenstein.

In addition to the corps mentioned, the mobile portions of the garrisons of Thorn, Kulm, Graudenz and Marienburg had been moved by rail to Lautenburg and Strasburg. They formed Von Muhlmann's force and were now guarding the right flank in touch with hostile cavalry; Von der Goltz's Landwehr Division was near Biesselen in the centre, having just arrived by rail from the duty of frontier guard on the Schleswig-Holstein frontier. This division was given the task of taking Hohenstein. A Landwehr Brigade was also co-operating with XVII Corps.

The attack on the south commenced at 4 a.m., 27th August, and after heavy fighting Usdau was captured in the afternoon by I Corps. The Russian I Corps was driven south to Soldau and I German Corps commenced its march on Neidenburg. The XX Corps, however, made no progress and was held up everywhere by the Russian XV Corps. By that evening I Reserve Corps and XVII Corps had reached the line Wartenburg—Mensguth, having defeated the Russian VI Corps on the evening of the previous day (26th) and driven it south. Von der Goltz's Division was approaching Hohenstein. On this day Samsonov was only worried by the fighting between Muhlen and Usdau. He was ignorant of the disaster to his VI Corps and the German

threat from the north until the morning of 28th August. Actually the Russian VI Corps retreated after only a portion of one division had been seriously engaged, although the corps commander had clear orders to fight his way to Allenstein. The fact was, the Corps Headquarters had no communication with Army Headquarters and was ignorant of the general situation. Furthermore, one of its divisions bolted from the German heavy artillery fire.

Early on 28th, Neidenburg was taken by I Corps, but again no progress was made by XX Corps who, moreover, expected a hostile counter-attack. However, the situation improved in the afternoon, the northern flank of XX Corps making progress towards Waplitz and Hohenstein, and Von der Goltz entering Hohenstein after severe fighting with the Russian XIII Corps, which had moved during the day from Allenstein on Hohenstein. Meantime I Reserve and XVII Corps had again advanced to a line about 6 miles south-west of Passenheim—Alenstein. The Russian XIII Corps was thus getting driven into a ring with the other two Russian Corps.

On 29th August overwhelming success was made certain for the Germans by the closing of the circle along the line Muschaken—Willenburg by portions of I and XX Corps reaching the first place and portions of I and XVII the latter.

The Russian I Corps on the south joined in the battle again on 29th by attacking I German Corps at Neidenburg from the south. But after a critical period they were driven off.

Severe fighting took place on 30th August at Muschaken and the places where the Russians tried to break through the German ring, but these attempts never succeeded. Masses of Russian prisoners were captured on the 29th and succeeding days, the total being over 90,000. The Russian Second Army had been destroyed. The Germans claim to have killed, wounded and captured 170,000 Russians at a

cost of 15,000 casualties. Hindenburg and Ludendorff had their Army Headquarters throughout the battle behind the I and XX Corps and had practically no telephonic communication with the northern wing, i.e. I Reserve and XVII Corps, during 27th, 28th and 29th August. It was as much as they could do to get evening situations from these corps, on which they had to base general directions for the next day's fighting. But it should be remembered that Mackensen was on that flank, for at that time he commanded XVII Corps.

On the Russian side Samsonov moved on horseback on the morning of 28th August right up to XV Corps and was quite out of touch with his two flank corps throughout the battle. He sent all his wireless and signal apparatus back over the frontier with his baggage. All through the 29th August Samsonov with his Army Headquarters, now little more than a few mounted Staff Officers, accompanied XV Corps in their retreat through the woods north of Neidenburg. They could find no way through the encircling ring of the German Army. That night Samsonov kept saying to his staff that the disgrace of such a defeat was more than he could bear. At length he said :—" The Emperor trusted me. How can I face him after such a disaster ? " He went aside and his staff heard a shot. They saw him no more, and could not even find his body in the dark. The Army Staff escaped by walking 40 miles into Poland.

The Russian disaster was due to several causes. But first and foremost, the Russian Second Army, lacking equipment and communications and rear services, and commanded by such a man as Samsonov, was a very inferior instrument of war to the Eighth German Army handled by Hindenburg and Ludendorff. The Russian corps commanders were also very inferior and had small idea how to handle their corps or to co-operate with each other. They could do nothing without definite orders, which of course they

never received. Three corps commanders, also Jilinski, were dismissed from their commands.

Jilinski, commanding the North-West Front, failed to appreciate the dangers attendant on operations on exterior lines with bad communications to the rear and no inter-communication between his armies, especially when faced by such an active mobile and highly-trained army as the Germans, who were operating in their own country, a country splendidly equipped with roads and railways. Lack of co-operation between Rennenkampf and Samsonov was another great factor in the Russian defeat. Firstly, Rennenkampf should never have allowed the Germans to disengage their whole army from his front. If there was any clear plan he should have pressed on at all costs to join Samsonov even with only a portion of his army if he could not supply all. Secondly, Jilinski should have kept Rennenkampf better informed of Samsonov's situation. The only orders Jilinski gave Rennenkampf were as follows—

On 26th August to send the reserve troops of XX Corps (two reserve divisions) to invest Königsberg. Remainder to pursue towards the Vistula. The forward move only started on 27th, and then only with half the army, for Rennenkampf sent two whole corps to invest Königsberg instead of the reserve troops of one corps.

On 27th Jilinski became aware of Samsonov's danger and ordered Rennenkampf to send II Corps to Passenheim and the left flank of First Army to advance, to co-operate. On 28th and 29th portions of II and IV Corps approached the line Bossau—Bischofstein and to the north. If only this move had been made two or three days earlier Samsonov might have been saved and the German left wing might have been crushed.

On 29th Jilinski ordered Rennenkampf by telegram to retreat, as Samsonov was already surrounded.

It would appear to be a mistake on Rennenkampf's part to detach half the First Army to Königsberg. The garrison

could have been held in check with far less. Rennenkampf should have been ordered to move south-west with all his forces several days earlier than he did.

Jilinski failed in his plan, in rapid decision and issue of orders, and in furnishing information to his armies.

To consider the actual dispositions of the two opposing sides for battle. Samsonov had his five corps spread out on a front of 45 miles advancing with the bulk of his cavalry on his south-west flank. The Germans operated with two strong groups separated at the commencement of the fighting by some 20 to 30 miles, but which they succeeded in concentrating on the battlefield at the decisive time and place.

The result was that the Russian Army was split up into three separated groups by the first German attacks. The centre and largest group was completely destroyed while the flank groups were defeated and driven back into Russia.

MASURIAN LAKES. (MAP IX.)

At the end of August the Austro-Hungarian armies were in a critical position in Galicia, but before giving them any direct help it was essential for the Eighth Army to deal with Rennenkampf who, as a result of Tannenberg, had withdrawn his advanced troops, but apparently intended to stand and fight between river Pregel at Wehlau and lake Mauer.

The Eighth Army received at this time two corps and a cavalry division from the Western Front, and thus had six organized corps of two divisions each, together with 3rd Reserve Division, Von der Goltz's Landwehr Division, the Königsberg garrison and Landwehr from the Vistula fortresses, a total of some sixteen or seventeen divisions with two cavalry divisions. Rennenkampf had eleven divisions and five cavalry divisions. It appears probable that the German formations were kept up to strength while the Russian divisions, according to Gen. Gourko's book, had received no drafts since they mobilized.

At the beginning of September the Eighth Army deployed

ready to advance on the line Willenburg—Ortelsburg—Seeburg—Wormditt. The newly-arrived Corps (XI and Guard Reserve) had been detrained on the northern flank.

Ludendorff's plan was to advance in three groups, making a frontal attack between lake Mauer and river Pregel with four corps, an enveloping attack issuing from the defiles of the Masurian Lakes via Lotzen and south of it with two corps and two cavalry divisions, and a flank guard of two independent divisions operating via Bialla and Lyck.


The Konigsberg garrison on the north to hold the line of the Deime and the Vistula fortress garrisons to defend the frontier about Soldau.

The advance began on 4th September, only four days after Tannenberg had ended. By the 7th the four northern corps had reached the Russian positions on the line Angerburg—Nordenburg—Gerdauen—Wehlau and commenced their attack next day. The attacks were not very successful and the Russians made heavy counter-attacks. This absorbed the only army reserve, a division of XX Corps west of lake Mauer which had been intended to strengthen the enveloping attack. East of Lotzen the fighting was severe on 8th and 9th September. However, the southern Corps (I) had evidently found the enemy's flank and on the 9th by moving northwards from Arys, it cleared the way for the cavalry and XVII Corps about Lotzen. Jilinski's chief of staff had advised Rennenkampf to withdraw, concentrate and threaten the German advance through the defiles of the lakes, but Rennenkampf said it would be bad for the troops to withdraw. Jilinski was ill. It was worse for the troops when the German blow fell.


The flank guard had been fighting from 3rd to 9th September on the Bialla—Lyck line against a superior enemy, but held them up, and finally drove them back to Osovet—Augustov—Suwalki, the two latter places being taken. This flank guard was of great importance as fresh Russian forces

BATTLE OF TANNENBERG
27th to 30th August. 1914.

27th to 30th August. 1914.



BATTLE OF TANNENBERG, 27TH TO 30TH AUGUST, 1914



BATTLE OF THE MASURIAN LAKES, 8TH TO 13TH SEPTEMBER, 1914

his main communications by road and rail to Kovna could be cut. Advantage was taken of the country for this decisive enveloping attack to issue from the little known area of the lakes where the Russians expected no large forces. Once the Russian retreat commenced, the Germans pushed their pursuit relentlessly and thus reaped the greatest possible fruits of victory.

In the course of a fortnight the Eighth German Army had completely reversed the state of the war in East Prussia. Two numerically superior Russian Armies had been beaten, East Prussia freed of the enemy, and 135,000 prisoners taken, besides quantities of guns and stores. Some quarter of a million casualties had been inflicted on the Russians and, in fact, a quarter of the whole of the Russian Armies had been put out of action. The Russian armies had been fatally crippled and the *Entente* suffered from this till the end of the war.

There is this to be said for the Russians, that their rapid and unexpected advance into East Prussia with incomplete rear organization, had upset the German war plan from the start. It had been the direct cause of a diversion of force from the German armies fighting the Battle of the Marne, and had also absorbed large quantities of German munitions, a matter of no small account at that time. In fact, this relief on the Marne may have turned the whole course of the war.

CHAPTER VIII

FIRST AND SECOND INVASIONS OF POLAND

FIRST INVASION OF POLAND, 1914. (MAP X.)

In the east by the middle of September the Russians had driven the defeated Austrian armies across the river San. The German successes in East Prussia were not of any direct effect in assisting the Austrians, distances were too great and Russian reinforcements were assembling in the north. Therefore, in order to try and rally the disorganized Austrians and to stave off the serious threat of an invasion of the vital territory of Upper Silesia, it was necessary to send German troops south to assist directly the Austrians. Further, the hopes of Turkey joining the Central Powers depended on stopping any further Russian successes. The alliance of Turkey and with it the permanent closing of the Dardanelles was essential to cripple Russia economically.

Accordingly, a new Ninth Army was formed under Hindenburg and Ludendorff consisting of some $5\frac{1}{2}$ corps. These troops commenced to entrain in the Lotzen area and the Königsberg area on the night 16th-17th September and moved by two rail routes to the front Krakau—Krenzberg along the Polish frontier, where they were deployed ready to advance by 28th September. This move of $5\frac{1}{2}$ corps over a distance of between 400 and 500 miles required some 750 troop trains.

Only weak forces had been left in East Prussia.

The Austro-German advance commenced between 28th September and 4th October all along the line from the Carpathians northwards. By 12th October the German

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Ninth Army was up to the Vistula and at the outskirts of Warsaw. They had only been opposed by a Russian cavalry corps of five cavalry divisions. But the Russians had made preparations on a vast scale for a counter-stroke and orders captured by the Germans gave away their plan, which was an advance in force across the Vistula from the San River to Warsaw with a strong enveloping attack from the north of Warsaw. In three weeks or less the Grand Duke Nicholas succeeded in moving three armies, Ninth, Fifth and Fourth, 100 miles north to the zone between Sandomir and Warsaw and in assembling a reconstituted Second Army at Warsaw. This re-grouping took place in safety behind the Vistula, covered by a mass of Russian cavalry west of the river.

THE RUSSIAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

The Russians held up the Austrian armies on the San River and on 18th October counter-attacked and began to drive them back. This, combined with pressure from the north-west of Warsaw and on the Austrians at Radom, forced the German Ninth Army to retreat. The whole line recoiled to the river Dunajec—river Nida—west of Lodz, where the Russian advance was temporarily checked by the very thorough destruction of roads and railways carried out by the German Ninth Army in their retreat from Poland. As an example of the Russian difficulties, for ten days their Ninth Army was supplied from the Vistula by horse transport over 120 miles of terrible road. Horses died in harness and men had to drag the guns. The situation was again very serious in the east. The Austrian Armies had by now lost 1,000 guns and 200,000 prisoners. No reinforcements except for two cavalry divisions were yet available from the west, as Falkenhayn had determined to continue his attack at Ypres. In addition to the great Russian advance on the front from the Carpathians to Warsaw, attacks were developed

in East Prussia by a newly-formed Russian Tenth Army. The German invasion was a bold move, but was undertaken with entirely inadequate forces, or else the Germans placed the Russian command and troops at a lower value than facts warranted.

At the beginning of November, Hindenburg became Commander-in-Chief in the East of all German troops, with Ludendorff as his Chief of General Staff.

The Grand Duke Nicholas intended to invade Silesia, and advance on Breslau with his Fifth, Fourth and Ninth Armies. The First and Second Armies were to guard the right flank while the Third and Eighth Armies in Galicia secured the left. This ambitious project failed through the difficulties of supply to the offensive group, the deficiency of communications in the whole army, and the slowness of the left flank guard to advance. The Russian armies stumbled slowly forward, while the more nimble Germans prepared a counter-stroke.

THE SECOND INVASION OF POLAND

The Commander-in-Chief in the East now decided on a bold move to throw back the Russians and possibly defeat them decisively. The plan, which was devised by Ludendorff, was to disengage the Ninth Army from the Chenstokov area and move it north to an area between Thorn and Posen, whence it could advance south-east with its left flank on the Vistula and attack the northern flank of the Russian main armies. Troops were also taken from the Eighth Army to assist. The transfer of the Ninth Army right across the front of the enemy involved another great railway operation, 800 troop trains were required, exclusive of ammunition and supply trains.

By seriously weakening the Eighth Army and the forces from Chenstokov to the river Varta, a force of $5\frac{1}{2}$ corps was concentrated for this blow under Gen. von Mackensen, who had been given command of the Ninth Army. Four corps

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were transferred from the west after the Ypres battle had ceased, but these arrived after Mackensen moved.

Mackensen's attack on 12th November surprised the Russians, for their intelligence service was inadequate and the Ninth German Army had been lost trace of for a fortnight. After severe and fluctuating fighting the Russians were driven back with the help of the reinforcements from the west, to the line river Nida—Skernevisi junction by 12th December.

The details of this second invasion, culminating in a great battle round Lodz, are of extreme interest and form one of the most interesting operations on the Eastern Front.

THE BATTLE OF LODZ. (MAP XI.)

By 10th November the German Ninth Army, under Mackensen, consisting of 5½ corps and five cavalry divisions, was assembled between the Vistula and the Warta Rivers on the German-Polish frontier. Another corps was ready to co-operate further south (Posen and Breslau Corps).

This concentration was opposite the left of the Russian First Army, which was on a front of 100 miles with five corps, and the right of the Russian Second Army, which was more concentrated.

Ludendorff's plan was to crush the left of Russian First Army, rather isolated south of the Vistula, and then to envelope the right of the Russian Second Army and roll up the Russian battle-front.

Mackensen's advance began on 11th November and on 12th November he captured Vlotslavsk on the Vistula with 12,000 prisoners from V Siberian Corps. Rennenkampf passed VI Siberian and part of VI Corps to the south of the Vistula to block the German advance.

On 14th November II Corps (First Russian Army) and XXIII Corps (Second Russian Army) were attacked in overwhelming strength.

Schiedemann, commanding Second Russian Army, pro-

ceeded to move his army so as to face north-east on the front Strikov—Lenchitsa and threaten a further German advance in flank. But the rapidity of the German moves nearly caused his troops to be defeated in detail.

On 15th and 16th November, the three corps of the First Russian Army south of the Vistula and the two northern corps of the Second Army were all heavily attacked and lost 25,000 prisoners.

The Germans were succeeding in splitting the First and Second Russian Armies, the latter being forced south-east to Lodz where its four corps were forced into a circle round the town.

Meantime Plehve's Fifth Russian Army was pushing forward all unknowing to the Silesian frontier. But on 17th November he retired under orders to a line due south of Lodz.

On 17th November, the Second Russian Army was in a critical position. It had been badly hammered by the Germans for the last three days, and now its right flank was completely turned, for a German cavalry division and 1½ corps had got round right behind and to the south-east of Lodz. Three German corps were attacking frontally and driving the Russians back on to Lodz, while the Posen and Breslau Corps was threatening the Russian left flank from the south-west.

The Russian First Army could give no help, for its southern corps were retreating up the Vistula from the victorious German I Reserve Corps.

RUSSIAN COUNTER-MEASURES

However, the Russians succeeded by vigorous and well-timed counter-measures in saving their Second Army. The credit of these successful manoeuvres must be given to Razski, now commanding the North-West Front, so far as their inception is concerned, and to Plehve, commanding the Fifth Russian Army, as regards their execution. If

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only Rennenkampf (First Russian Army) had carried out his share of Ruzski's plan, the tables would have been completely turned on the Germans and their enveloping wing would have been cut off and surrounded.

But, as we shall see, Rennenkampf failed to move in time.

CHARACTERS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMANDERS

Ruzski, the commander of the Front, had been brilliantly successful as an army commander in August and September, but his health was bad and he only returned from sick leave to succeed Jilinski. He was a highly educated soldier, who knew how to use his staff, a thing many Russian generals failed in.

Plehve was an old man, bent and wizened, and also weak in health, but, in spite of this, he commanded an army with uniform success throughout the war, in 1915 and 1916 he was continually moved from front to front as he was one of the few Russian generals who could compete with the Germans. Plehve was of German origin and his character was quite different to the ordinary Russian, who is reputed to be merry, happy-go-lucky and careless. Plehve was dry, logical, unpopular, very exacting, but a man of iron will and unmoved in any emergency. He influenced his whole army to achieve great things. Sometimes his methods were unusual, when, for instance, later in the war he put sentries on the corps headquarters of his army and on the bridges over the Dvina to prevent them from moving back out of the Dvina bridgehead. It is interesting to note that Plehve's Chief of Staff was Miller, who later was with the British forces in North Russia after the revolution.

Rennenkampf had been a dashing cavalry leader in the Russo-Japanese War, but as the commander of a modern army he is described by Gen. Knox in his book as "an anachronism and a danger." His relations with his staff were a little strained, for one day he told his Chief of Staff

to "take his snout away as he could not bear the sight of it any longer."

SUCCESS BY FIFTH RUSSIAN ARMY

Plehve was ordered north to assist the Second Russian Army. On 17th November he sent a division by rail to Skernevitsi, only one regiment got through when the line was cut by German cavalry. The rest of the division attacked the Germans at Tushin on 19th.

The rest of the Fifth Army marched north on 18th. On 18th and 19th the left of Second Army was secured by successful attacks by two of Plehve's corps west and south-west of Lodz. A part of this force then turned to face the more pressing danger from the Germans under Schaffer, commanding XXV German Reserve Corps, south of Lodz. They attacked the Germans on 22nd November from the west and drove them back. At this time these Germans were facing Lodz on the south and holding Rjgov, Tushin and Bendkov.

FAILURE OF RENNENKAMPF AND THE "LOVICH FORCE"

Meantime Rennenkampf had been ordered to act from the north. He despatched forces from Lovich on 20th November, and Skernevitsi on 21st. The latter had a division and a regiment and did nothing!

The Lovich Force had $3\frac{1}{2}$ divisions, but it was hastily formed with no proper staff, transport, etc. Its commander was changed twice in thirty-six hours. It only moved 5 miles on 20th November. On 21st it reached roughly the line Strikov—Brezini and got in touch with the rear of Schaffer's German columns.

On 22nd the Lovich Force captured Strikov—Brezini and Kolyushki after heavy fighting and touch was obtained with the Second Russian Army at Lodz. II Russian Corps

supported the Lovich Force at Strikov. It would have appeared that nothing could save Schaffer's German Force. At 7 p.m. Schaffer was ordered to retire by the German Ninth Army and to re-establish his lines of communication by driving back the Lovich Force. On 23rd November the centre columns of Lovich Force moved right through to the Second Russian Army near Lodz. The result was that the left of Lovich Force, one division (6th Siberian Division) was isolated west of Kolyushki. This division reported three German columns, estimated at three divisions, marching against it from the south. The 6th Siberian Division appealed for help to the Russian I Corps who had troops in Andrjespol, east of Lodz, only 4 miles from their flank. I Corps refused to move and on reference to Second Army nothing was done.

On 23rd, 6th Siberian Division fought successfully all day on the line Yanovka—Galkov. They captured German prisoners, who by this time were terribly depressed as they thought they were surrounded.

Early on 24th the German columns moving north worked round both flanks of the isolated 6th Siberian Division. The headquarters of Lovich Force were surprised in Brezini without any escort and escaped with difficulty to an armoured train at Kolyushki. It lost touch with the whole of its force and remained a helpless spectator of the destruction of 6th Siberian Division. The Russians at Andrjespol made a poor attempt about 9 a.m. to relieve their right (western) flank. A Russian cavalry division, supposed to guard their left (eastern) flank, retired at once. The 6th Siberian Division, assailed by three times its strength on front and both flanks, retired at 11 a.m., but finding Brezini in German hands, it broke up and only 1,500 men escaped to Skernevitsi.

Schaffer, XXV German Reserve Corps with 3rd Guard Division and two cavalry divisions not only made good his escape via Strikov to rejoin the Ninth German

Army, but brought with him 16,000 prisoners and sixty-four captured guns.

THE GENERAL SITUATION END OF 1914

The Ninth German Army then received further reinforcements from the Western Front, released by the termination of the First Battle of Ypres. They advanced again and by 12th December had captured Lovich and Lodz. The Russians fell back to a line from Skernevitsi to the river Dunajec. The Russian offensive against Silesia was broken.

Meantime in the south the Austrians had held the Russians and in battles south-east of Krakau had driven them back across the river Dunajec. The winter season now called a halt in the operations and trench warfare ensued.

OBSERVATIONS

The value of a strategic retreat is exemplified by the German withdrawal after the first invasion of Poland. Roads and railways are vital to the operations of an advancing army. Their thorough destruction will stop an army of any size and allow the retreating force to disengage and even to regain the initiative.

To consider the strategy of the counter-offensive of the Grand Duke Nicholas in his method of advance to the frontier. He had not the necessary forces nor the communications to advance in deep columns on a continuous front as the Germans had done in Belgium in August. But he attempted to extend his First, Second, Fifth, Fourth and Ninth Armies right across the Polish salient on a front of over 250 miles. The result was a thin line everywhere, no reserves to meet eventualities, no power of manoeuvre. The Germans, with their mobility and highly-organized communications, could strike him unawares anywhere and were almost certain to be able to break his thin front. The only counter open to the Russians was slow and ponderous side-stepping or retreat.

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The Russians would surely have been better placed with their armies more concentrated, in greater depth on the front where they desired to get forward, i.e. Silesia and towards Breslau and with the intervals between armies or the flanks of their offensive group protected by the masses of cavalry which they had available, but of which they made little use.

Compare the bold plan for the second invasion of Poland with the conduct by Moltke of the first campaign in France. It required great courage and determination on the part of Hindenburg and Ludendorff to leave the Polish-German frontier almost unprotected during the move north of the Ninth Army. A commander who will take no risks will probably never win great victories.

The tactical situation in the Lodz battle and its kaleidoscopic changes are of course astounding. It would appear that the Germans attempted the operation with too small forces. If they could have delivered a more decisive blow on the south-west of Lodz and the Breslau Corps could have joined Schaffer at Rjgov, the Second Russian Army would have been destroyed.

The direction of the Lovich Force by Rennenkampf and his subordinate in immediate command was hopelessly inefficient. Right up to the morning of 24th November the smallest co-ordination would have entrapped the Germans. The closing of the gaps between Andrjespol—Yanovka and Galkov—Kolyushki was all that was needed.


The higher Russian Command also does not seem to have kept its subordinates informed, for Lovich Force knew nothing of Plehve's moves and that Schaffer was being attacked in rear at Rjgov and Tushin. Headquarters of North-West Front was 120 miles from the battle, too far for any useful direction.

The German cavalry must have kept their command well informed, they penetrated nearly to Petrokov. Mackensen, at Ninth Army Headquarters was always in touch with

GERMAN STRATEGY IN THE GREAT WAR.


Positions of the Opposing Forces on the 11th Nov. 1914.

SECOND INVASION OF POLAND



German Troops.


Russian Troops.



SECOND INVASION OF POLAND

BATTLE OF LODZ.
17th to 22nd November, 1914.

Scale of Miles.
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BATTLE OF LODZ, 17TH TO 22ND NOVEMBER, 1914

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Schaffer and chose the last possible moment to order a retreat. With a more active enemy he might have been too late. The fog of war was, on the other hand, as black as night in the Russian Headquarters, and the only thing their cavalry appear to have achieved was the rapid retreat of a whole cavalry division from Galkov and the exposure of 6th Siberian Division's flank.

Both Germans and Russians in turn were within short distance of a great tactical success. In fact, the Russians were so optimistic that they ordered eighteen railway trains up to take the prisoners away!

These operations, if further details are ever available, will be of unique interest from the point of view of the psychology of command, and the strain on commanders' nerves. It is probable that Mackensen and Schaffer would come out of it with flying colours, for Schaffer's retreat was masterly and his orders must have been very rapid and clear. Whereas Schiedemann (Second Russian Army) was soon reduced to a state of inertia. Rennenkampf and his Lovich Force commanders (Slyusarenko, Shuvalov, and Vasiliev in turn) never had a grip of the situation. Plehve (Fifth Russian Army) was brilliant and he got his troops to carry out complicated and very long marches with great rapidity.

CHAPTER IX

"1915"

SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1915. (MAP XII.)

The Austrian Armies were being pressed by the Russians on the crest of the Carpathians early in 1915. The Austrian Supreme Command was anxious to relieve the situation there on the borders of Hungary and also to relieve the besieged fortress of Przemyśl. They proposed to launch an attack from the southern part of their front and requested German Supreme Command to attack at the other extremity of the long Eastern Front, in the belief that a decisive success could be obtained thus against the Russians. The Headquarters of Commander-in-Chief in the East, i.e. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, were also strongly in favour of this scheme, considering that Russia might be finally defeated. There were four newly-formed corps in Germany now ready for use and both Austrian Supreme Command and the Commander-in-Chief in the East were anxious to use them on the East Front in an attack from East Prussia.

However, Falkenhayn, the Chief of the General Staff, was convinced that two operations so widely separated, 350 miles apart and conducted with the comparatively small forces available, could not achieve a decisive success. He also considered the Western Front the decisive theatre, and totally disagreed with the catchword going round in certain German quarters, that "the war would be won in the east." He considered that no decision in the east would affect the determination of France and England to fight on, and therefore determined that the Germans must first win victory in

the west. So at the beginning of 1915 he determined to use the four new army corps in the west.

Falkenhayn wished the Austrians to give up their proposed offensive against Russia and use their troops to defeat Serbia finally, thus restoring their shattered prestige in the Balkans, shattered by their disastrous operations in Serbia in November and December, 1914, and open communications to the Middle East. He offered to carry out local attacks against the Russians in Poland to relieve the Carpathians Front.

However, the situation became so serious in the Carpathians that in the middle of January Austrian reserves on the Danube had to be sent there and German reserves from Poland also had to go to give direct support. This stopped any possibility of relief attacks by the Germans.

Falkenhayn then regarded the Austro-Hungarian armies as on the point of collapse. So he was forced to change his decisions regarding the new corps and sent them to the Eastern Front to carry out an attack from East Prussia while the Austrians did their best in the south, reinforced by the German troops (Southern German Army under Linsingen) already sent there, to clear the enemy from the frontier of Hungary.

At the beginning of February, 1915, the Austrians and Germans in the Carpathians attacked and recaptured most of the Bukovina, but they made little or no progress along the Carpathians to the north. No great success was obtained and Przemyśl was not relieved. It fell on March 22nd.

WINTER BATTLE IN MASURIA. (SEE MAP NO. XII.)

In the north the Winter Battle in Masuria was started on 8th February by the Eighth and Tenth German Armies. The plan was to envelope the main Russian forces in East Prussia by strong attacks through Johannsburg—Raigrod on the south and through Vladislavov—Kalvariya on the north, that is, an enveloping attack on both flanks. The

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attacks surprised the Russians and a great tactical victory ensued, resulting in the destruction of the northern Russian Army, a portion of it being surrounded and forced to surrender in the Augustov forest. 110,000 prisoners were taken by the Germans. Owing to the severe weather, difficulties of communications, and the exhaustion of the troops, the operations came to a stop. East Prussia was again clear of the enemy. This success was followed by heavy Russian counter-attacks on the Polish Front against the Germans which were easily repulsed. But in the Carpathians the fighting again turned to a Russian offensive and at the end of March more Germans had to be sent to the northern Carpathians to support the wavering Austrians.

It appears that Falkenhayn was correct in his appreciation that nothing more than tactical successes could be gained by these operations.

It is interesting to note that Ludendorff in his book rather skims over the larger strategical aspect of these battles of February, 1915. Whereas it appears clear from Falkenhayn that Ludendorff was to a large extent the instigator of the combined Austrian and German plan. Throughout 1915 we shall see that Ludendorff hankered after a large enveloping movement from the eastern frontier of East Prussia.

From this time on Falkenhayn decided that if the Austrian Armies were to be used in offensive battles they must be directly supported by German troops, in fact the Germans would invariably have to act as the spearhead of the attack. He also made up his mind that with the limited forces available on the vast extent of Eastern Front, continuation of operations against the extreme flanks would not offer prospects of big successes. The point was that the enemy could not be tied down by frontal attacks sufficiently to allow strategical envelopment by the wings to succeed. The enemy could always retreat.

GREAT OFFENSIVE IN RUSSIA, 1915. (MAP XII.)

Austrian General Headquarters now, at the end of March, became so alarmed at the situation that they demanded from the Germans a reinforcement of ten German divisions. In addition, they thought that the entry into the war of both Italy and Rumania as enemies was imminent. The Serbians were also threatening to cross the Danube. In fact, the Austrians "had the wind up" all round. Falkenhayn, in preference to dispersing his reserves in purely defensive measures on the Austrian Front, now decided on an offensive campaign in Russia on the largest possible scale with the object of permanently destroying Russia's power of attack. Note that he did not hope to defeat finally the Russian nation and drive them out of the war. He wished to render the Eastern Front safe and passive so that he could again turn the main German Armies to the west.

Other factors which influenced this decision were that indications had been appearing amongst the Russians of serious shortage of trained reinforcements and also shortage of rifles and munitions. As a matter of fact, the Russian expenditure of shells had averaged *45,000 a day* since the beginning of the war, while their home production was only *35,000 rounds a month*. The whole of their mobilization reserve had gone and they were very slow to place orders abroad. At the beginning of 1915 the establishment of the forty-seven corps on the front should have been 2,200,000 combatants. The total strength on the front was only 1,200,000. There were no trained reserves available. Rifles also were deficient. Drafts came up unarmed and waited to be equipped from dead men.

It also became clear to Falkenhayn that the French and British offensives in the west which commenced seriously in March, could be held in check with less forces than were then on the Western Front. Until the March battles on the west, that is, in the Champagne and at Neuve Chapelle, had

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been fought and the defence had been successful, Falkenhayn dared not weaken that front. After those attacks he had a fairly clear idea of what the German troops could achieve in defence.

Falkenhayn's reasons against enveloping operations have already been given ; he decided on a break-through attack, and after considering communications for concentration and supply, and obstacles to be faced in the advance, the front between the northern Carpathians (Beskiden Mountains) and the upper Vistula was chosen. Also large Russian forces had recently been withdrawn from there for their Carpathian offensive. Falkenhayn attached such importance to secrecy that he did not even inform Austrian Supreme Command of his decision until the middle of April, when the German troops were already entrained for the move to their concentration area. In spite of this, the Russians received some warning, but did not act upon it in time. On 24th April successful attacks were carried out from East Prussia as a diversion. They drew considerable Russian reinforcements north.

On 2nd May the great attack was begun by the Eleventh German Army under Mackensen on the river Dunajec between Gorlice and Tarnow. This army was composed mainly of formations from the Western Front. Very great success was achieved, and after a month's operations Przemyśl and the river San were reached, and the Russians were retreating on a front of 250 miles.

During May there were big efforts on the Western Front in the way of relief offensives by the English between Bethune and Armentières and by the French between Arras and Lens. These attacks were all held. On 24th May, Italy declared war against Austria. Austria wished to divert forces from the Galician offensive to crush Italy at once, but Falkenhayn would under no circumstances agree to this. He insisted on a policy of defence in the mountains and on the Isonzo, and to assist in this he consented to

relieve Austrian troops on the Danube with new German formations. These German formations were then suitably placed for use against Rumania or Serbia as required.

To revert to the Galician operations. These had practically come to a standstill on river San owing to heavy Russian reinforcements coming up. If the situation remained like this, prospects were bad. Russian counter-attacks had already commenced and the Austrian Armies would disintegrate under them. It was essential to continue to attack and defeat the Russians. No other sector of the Eastern Front offered such good prospects as the river San. By continuing the advance here first eastwards and then northwards there were prospects of outflanking and enveloping the whole Russian-Polish Front. The Russians had no further prepared positions in this sector. A transfer of the attacking armies to another part of the front would not offer such good prospects and would also cause delay in which the Russians could reorganize.

Therefore, at the end of May, the Germans brought all possible reinforcements to Galicia by thinning out the remainder of the Eastern Front, by drawing in the new formations from their training-grounds on the Danube, and by transferring $2\frac{1}{2}$ more divisions from the west, reducing their reserves there to a dangerous minimum. In this way $6\frac{1}{2}$ fresh divisions were concentrated.

In the fresh attacks success was achieved, although no great enveloping movement ensued owing to the failure of the Austrians south of the river Stryj. Lemberg was taken on 22nd June.

These events led to certain immediate advantages to the Central Powers; as the threat to Hungary was removed, Austria could send sufficient reinforcements to the Italian Front; Turkey was relieved from an attack on the Bosphorus for which a Russian army had been prepared at Odessa; finally, the pacification of Rumania's hostile

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intentions and the resumption of negotiations with Bulgaria ensued.

Falkenhayn now considered the possibility of continuing the attacks. The reserves on the Western Front had become so exhausted that he had to return four divisions from Galicia to the west, and, moreover, indications pointed to great French and British attacks at a later period, about September, which would certainly involve further transfers. He therefore determined to continue operations with a limited objective. This was in contradiction to Ludendorff's views. The latter now advocated a decisive attack on Kovna and north of it in the direction of Vilna and Minsk in order to cut off all the Russian forces in the Polish salient.

However, Falkenhayn insisted on his plan of continuing his main attack in the south, but this time to attack in a northerly direction towards Brest Litovsk. As the Russians had strong forces on this flank of the Polish salient, it was necessary to assist by attacks elsewhere. The Commander-in-Chief in the East, Hindenburg, was therefore ordered to co-operate by attacking on the river Narev sector, and was not to attack north of Kovna until these attacks had succeeded.

The attacks in the middle of July were successful both north and south, but necessitated the transfer of two divisions back from the west.

By the middle of August the Russians had been driven out of the Polish salient, but they had escaped without being surrounded as the Germans had hoped.

In this connection there was some acrimonious correspondence between German Supreme Command (Falkenhayn) and the Commander-in-Chief in the East (Hindenburg and Ludendorff) as to this failure. Hindenburg insisted that he would have succeeded in cutting the Russians off if he had attacked in strength at Kovna.

Falkenhayn replied that if the maximum force available

had been used by Hindenburg in the Narev operations they would have succeeded in penetrating sufficiently far to the south-east. It was a fact that Hindenburg had kept from two to four divisions up his sleeve during the Narev attacks, ready for his later Kovna operations.

At all events, in the middle of August, Falkenhayn decided to stop any further major operations in the east for the following reasons: there were now no further prospects of big strategical success; he wished to prepare the campaign against Serbia which he had been working for all this year and Bulgaria was now on the point of coming in; the storm cloud in the west was on the point of bursting in Champagne and Artois. Transfers of troops were immediately necessary.

There were further isolated attacks by the Commander-in-Chief in the East, on the north, and by the Austrians in the south, and by the end of September the line ran from Czernowitz—Tarnopol—Pinsk—Baranovichi—Dvinsk—west of Riga.

By the end of 1915 the Russian Armies had been reduced by wastage to a total of 650,000 rifles, to defend a front now 1,000 miles long. Divisions were far below establishment, the depots had been drained of drafts, and no more rifles were available to arm recruits.

DEFENSIVE IN THE WEST

The great attacks in the west on 25th September, 1915, tested the German Army almost to the limit, all the general reserves on the west were absorbed on the first day, and the Third German Army on the Champagne front very nearly commenced a general retreat, but was stopped by Supreme Command which arrived on the Western Front from the east on 25th September. Divisions from Russia were absorbed as fast as they arrived.

The German Front held firm and by the middle of October the fighting died down.

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CAMPAIGN IN SERBIA

Meantime the campaign against Serbia was commenced under the direction of Field-Marshal von Mackensen with the Eleventh German Army of seven divisions, Third Austro-Hungarian Army of four Austrian and three German divisions, and six Bulgarian divisions (equivalent in infantry to twelve German divisions).

This overwhelming force attacked the Serbians from two sides, north and east, and rapidly overran the country. The operations started on 6th October, 1915, and by 25th November practically the whole of Serbia was overrun and the Serbian Army dispersed. This had the effect of opening up communication between Germany and Turkey. Munitions could be sent, which made a great difference to Turkey's fighting power.

OBSERVATIONS

A tactical success will not achieve great results without a sound strategical plan. The distance apart of the flanks and the lack of force rendered the operations in Masuria and the Carpathians in February, 1915, barren of strategical results.

The proper use of reserves by Falkenhayn in April and May, 1915, is worthy of note. He used them for a decisive blow instead of dribbling them into action defensively as requested by the Austrians.

The battle on river Dunajec by Mackensen's Army demonstrates that in modern war "break-through" attacks may have decisive strategic results, although most of the experience of the last war points to envelopment.

Loyalty on the part of subordinate commanders to the plans and orders of the Higher Command is essential. Failure in this respect on the part of Hindenburg and Ludendorff may have allowed the Russians to escape disaster in Poland.

CHAPTER X

" 1916 "

SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916

The general situation as visualized by Falkenhayn in the winter of 1915-16 was as follows :—

France had been weakened almost to the last limit. The offensive power of the Russian Army was shattered. Serbia had been destroyed.

Italy was by this time disillusioned in her hopes of rapidly gaining her war aims.

England's determination and her hold on her allies was the chief menace.

In coming to a decision as to future operations, consider first the possibility of a blow at England on land. A blow at her in the east would be of no value, as it would not affect the result of the war even though it intensified England's difficulties in the Mohammedan world.

In the European theatre the problem was very difficult. The only objective worth while striving for would be to drive the English into the sea and the French south of the Somme. Even if this was successful, a further operation would be necessary, as the French Army would still be intact. The only means of achieving such a task would be by a breakthrough attack in mass, with a minimum strength of thirty divisions in the first attack followed by many others.

Lessons from the French and British attacks in 1915 held out no prospect of success against an enemy equally well armed and of similar numerical strength. The salients made by such attacks, exposed to flanking fire, would become

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mere slaughter-houses in which the attacking troops would be decimated.

As the total German reserves on the west would only amount to twenty-five or twenty-six divisions, even after reducing other fronts to a dangerous extent, such operations were not considered possible.

But if England's allies could be put out of the war, England, left alone, would probably give up.

It was necessary to employ every possible weapon that could strike at England, especially submarine warfare.

Now as regards which ally to attack. Italy's desertion alone would make no serious impression on England. Italy's military achievements were so small and she was so firmly in England's grip that it was not possible to agree to Austria's desire for a decisive attack on Italy. Besides, in any case, internal difficulties might drive Italy out of the war without further fighting. In Russia the same internal difficulties might compel her to give in, even if there was no revolution in the grand style. In the meantime she was not likely to revive her military reputation. German forces were not available for a decisive operation. Therefore a fresh attack on Russia was excluded.

There remained France. Positive military reasoning agreed with the above negative reasoning. A break-through attack was not necessary. The result of making France reach the breaking-point could probably be achieved with limited resources. There were certain objectives close to the French Front for the retention of which France must throw in her last man. The French Army would bleed to death and the moral effect on France if the objective was reached would be enormous.

Such an offensive was safest for Germany, as she could accelerate it or break it off at will.

Objectives:—Verdun or Belfort. Verdun is within 12 miles of the German main lateral railway and therefore a

standing threat to Germany. It would, therefore, be most advantageous to make Verdun the objective.

VERDUN

The attack on Verdun commenced on 22nd February and was carried on continuously until 11th July, when the last big attack took place there. The Germans only succeeded in advancing a maximum depth of 4 or 5 miles.

Falkenhayn had misjudged the French determination to hold on, and the strength of the Franco-British *Entente* or alliance.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE, MARCH, 1916. (MAP XIV.)

During the winter of 1915-16 the Russian General Headquarters, now under the Czar with Alexyiev as his Chief of General Staff, decided to make a great offensive from the Western Front with subsidiary operations on the North Front. The South-West Front was to remain passive. It is not clear why the offensive was to take place up in the north against the Germans, for hitherto the Russians had consistently failed against the Germans, and just as consistently succeeded against the Austrians.

The main effort was to be made by the Second Russian Army on each side of lake Narotch, with a strength of ten corps and a cavalry corps, with the object of breaking through and moving on Ponevjej, 100 miles to the west where they were to be joined by the Fifth Army who were attacking on a smaller scale from the Jacobstadt bridgehead in the north—an ambitious project. Smirnov, the commander of the Second Army, went sick just before the battle. There were four corps at hand as a reserve in the hands of the Army Group Commander.

The Germans had warning as usual and moved the equivalent of some five divisions to the threatened front.

The offensive commenced on 18th March, meantime a thaw had set in on 17th March, rendering the movement of all transport practically impossible. Why the Russians

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chose this time of year is inconceivable. Movement is possible on frozen ground in January and February, or on dried ground in June and onwards, but the annual thaw in March and April renders roads and open country alike impassable. Possibly help to the French at Verdun was the chivalrous reason.

After ten days, by 27th March, part of the offensive front had become a lake and operations had to cease. Nowhere was ground permanently gained, the greatest depth of penetration was only 2,000 yards.

The Russians lost between 100,000 and 150,000 men in this latter part of March in these operations. Generally speaking, the artillery bombardments were quite inadequate and the artillery failed to support the infantry in their advance. Desertion was rife from the infantry. After the thaw it froze again and on the morning of 22nd March, 300 men of one division were frozen to death and had to be hacked out of the ice where they lay.

No wonder Falkenhayn characterizes these Russian efforts as bloody sacrifices rather than attacks.

Meantime the Germans thought the southern part of the Eastern Front held by the Austrians, quite safe, for all the Russian reserves were in the north.

The Russians next turned to preparing a great offensive at Molodechno (south of the March offensive), to take place early in July, again under the command of the Western Front which, by June 1st, had five armies with fifty-eight divisions, while the Northern Front had thirty-eight divisions, and the much longer South-West Front also had only thirty-eight divisions. South of river Pripyat, i.e. opposite South-West Front, there were only two German divisions. North of the river Pripyat there were only two Austrian divisions.

BRUSILOV'S OFFENSIVE

In March, 1916, Gen. Brusilov had been promoted from the Eighth Army, with which he had been consistently

successful, to command the South-West Front. On 20th April he ordered all his armies to make plans for an offensive with only the resources then in their armies. Sectors where penetration could be achieved with small resources were to be selected and secrecy was enjoined.

In the middle of May the Austrians embarked on an adventure of their own devising in Italy contrary to the very strongly expressed wishes of German Supreme Command, who by this time had no faith in the Austrians undertaking any operations unsupported by German troops.

The Austrians reduced their strength opposite the Russian South-West Front in order to attack the Italians in Tirol. Their offensive had a certain success, but Italian counter-attacks finally drove them back practically to their original line.

It is believed that the King of Italy had made a personal appeal to the Czar for help. Brusilov was at all events asked if he could attack, and he replied, "as well now as some weeks later," which was his original intention.

His offensive was therefore launched on 4th June merely as a demonstration with local resources to keep the Austrians occupied on the Russian Front. Unfortunately there were no reserves within reach to exploit success, for Brusilov's attack came like a thunderbolt on the Austrians, whose front crumbled and broke from the Pripyat to the Carpathians.

The extraordinary contrast between German, Russian and Austrian troops is well brought out in these operations. The Austrian Army was practically only saved from dissolution, in spite of Brusilov's lack of reserves, by the presence of two German divisions in Linsinger's mixed German and Austrian Army just south of the Pripyat. This limited the penetration on the north and prevented expansion of the break. Also one German division in Bothmer's southern German Army in the centre of the Austrian Front prevented one of Brusilov's armies, the Eleventh, from advancing at

all in the first attack, for the sector they chose to attack was apparently held by Germans.

Brusilov's offensive was far more carefully prepared than the main Russian efforts in the north. Brusilov's immediate success completely upset all the calculations of Russian General Headquarters.

The Molodechno offensive was now abandoned and attempts made to pour troops to the South-West Front. It was, however, a race between the Russian railways and the German and Austrian railways, for the Germans began to send troops to the broken front from all theatres. Needless to say, the Russian railways did not win.

There was one more attack on the West Front at Baranovichi, made to hold the Germans in the north. Launched without due preparation, it failed with heavy loss, 80,000 Russian casualties in twelve days.

Brusilov's attacks continued in a second phase in July, when there were further great successes at Brody and Stanislau. The Eleventh Russian Army captured 40,000 prisoners at Brody alone in a very finely conceived operation. The Germans again saved the situation.

By the middle of August the Russians had taken 360,000 prisoners and 400 guns. The final check in the offensive at this time was entirely due to the arrival of adequate German reinforcements. It must be remembered that this great success was achieved with equipment and guns that would have been laughed at on the Western Front, and therefore the Russians paid the price in blood, for their losses in the first twenty-seven days were 375,000 and by the end of October more than a million on the South-West Front.

On 27th August Rumania declared war on the Central Powers.

CAVALRY IN BRUSILOV'S OFFENSIVE

The use of the Russian cavalry during these operations is interesting, especially as Gen. Knox, then attached to the

Russian Armies, has made a special study of the question in his book.

On 4th June there were thirteen cavalry divisions on Brusilov's front, a sufficiently large mass to have an enormous effect on a disintegrated army such as the Austrians became.

But apparently no plans were made either by Brusilov or by his armies for its use. Two of the armies used their cavalry to relieve infantry in the trenches so as to concentrate more infantry divisions for the initial attack. Possibly this was necessary in view of the shortage of troops. Brusilov himself, although he had spent sixteen years in the cavalry school at Petrograd, regarded this as the most useful rôle. Brusilov thought there had been only one chance for cavalry and that was on the Stokhod in the second stage in July, when a cavalry corps actually on the spot failed to push forward. Brusilov thought there was far too much cavalry in the Russian Army and advocated reducing the number of cavalry divisions by half. This was probably reasonable, considering the difficulty of feeding the fifty odd cavalry divisions on inferior lines of communication.

On the other hand, Kaledin, commanding the Eighth Army, was convinced that a cavalry corps on his front would have achieved enormous results after the 4th June. The Austrian Army was, in his opinion, sufficiently demoralized to fall an easy prey. Unfortunately he had used two of his four cavalry divisions to relieve infantry, Brusilov took one away to the north and his only remaining cavalry division was inadequate on his army front of 120 miles.

THE SOMME

It is difficult to get a true picture of the effects of the Somme Battle on the Germans from the information now available from German sources. This was the last battle which Falkenhayn directed before he was replaced by

Hindenburg and Ludendorff at Supreme Command. It is, therefore, perhaps natural that the picture he paints of the battle should be a very favourable one to the Germans, whereas Ludendorff on taking over takes the usual gloomy view of the incomer in a relief, and considers that everything he has taken over is bad.

The opening of the Somme Battle by an attack on a front of some twenty-five miles north and south of the Somme soon had the effect of stopping the Verdun offensive. The Germans did not expect such a heavy attack from the French south of the Somme and their local command and troops got into a state of some confusion there and withdrew from their second position in front of Biaches contrary to the intentions of Supreme Command.

There were alternative proposals for meeting the attack which was fully expected by the Germans north of the Somme. The first intention of the Supreme Command was to break the British attack by a counter-thrust on a large scale with objectives within the British line. This was, however, rendered impossible by lack of reserves in the west owing to diversion of German troops to Galicia and to the continuance of the Verdun attack, which was considered of more value in wearing out the French Army. The withdrawal of the German line of defence just prior to the attack was the second proposal, but this was vetoed, as it would have involved exchanging first-class defensive positions for other inferior ones, and a mere temporary postponement of the decisive battle.

So the German armies were instructed to hold their positions with such small reserves as were available.

It is interesting to consider what would have been the effect of a withdrawal such as Ludendorff had already carried out in the autumn of 1914 in Poland. With their lack of reserves it would have been folly for the Germans to withdraw unless they had a strong rear position ready. This they had not, nor had they the labour organized at

that time to construct it. If they had and had also destroyed roads and railways, it would undoubtedly have delayed the *Entente* offensive till too late in the year to have any great effect. The situation in Russia and Rumania would have been far easier, and the Verdun operation could have continued, possibly up to the capture of Verdun.

At all events there would have been no crisis such as was felt in Germany on Rumania's entry into the war on 27th August.

At this time Falkenhayn was of opinion that the Central Powers could not now win the war by the military destruction of one or more of their enemies by means of a few great concentrated efforts. He had concluded that it was a case of holding out and hammering into the *Entente* that the price of continuing the war and destroying Germany was too great to pay.

At the end of August the Kaiser sent for Hindenburg and Ludendorff for a consultation on the military situation. As this entrenched on the authority of the Chief of General Staff, Falkenhayn resigned, and his resignation was accepted. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were appointed to the Supreme Command.

FALKENHAYN

Col. Bauer describes Falkenhayn as follows :—

" He possessed great merits, and his capacity for work was boundless. He had a good memory and was quick in decision. Take him all round, he was a man of exceptional disposition, and would have made a brilliant statesman, diplomat or parliamentarian, but Commander-in-Chief fitted him least."

In January, 1915, we find Moltke, the fallen Chief of General Staff, writing privately to the Kaiser with whom he had remained on friendly terms, and expressing his opinion rather freely on his successor, Falkenhayn :—

" He (Falkenhayn) is a real danger to the Fatherland

... his strategy is one of lost opportunities. Through his short-sightedness . . . I specially do not say his ambition —we have suffered a severe defeat on the Yser."

These are rather hard words when we remember that Falkenhayn had taken over a losing cause from Moltke in September, 1914.

The actual events leading to Falkenhayn's fall are interesting, as apparently it was brought about by the influence of the Junior Staff at O.H.L., just as Prittwitz's and Moltke's removal had been. We are indebted for these accounts to Col. Bauer, who, according to his own reckoning, must have been somewhat of a "Kingmaker."

The Junior Staff were apparently alarmed at the losses in numbers and morale at Verdun, and on the Somme in August, 1916, and urged Tappen and then Bauer to take some action. After some delay, Bauer approached the War Minister on the subject, but nothing happened. Then he went to Gen. von Plessen (Kaiser's Military Cabinet), who was not at all pleased.

But nothing happened till Rumania declared war, when Bauer again went to Plessen and suggested that only Ludendorff could save the situation. The Kaiser apparently approved of this idea, for Hindenburg and Ludendorff were summoned.

In judging Falkenhayn, we must remember his success as an army commander in the field, for he went to command the Ninth German Army in the Rumanian Campaign on leaving O.H.L. and led it with great success under none too easy conditions. He afterwards went to the Turkish Front to control all the Turkish armies, but he did not save them from defeat in 1918.

Falkenhayn died in 1922.

LUDENDORFF AND THE SOMME

One of Ludendorff's first acts was to consider the infantry defensive tactics practised by the Germans on the Somme.

His criticisms were doubtless based on his experiences in the east. He regarded deep dug-outs and cellars in the front line as man-traps and drew attention to the superior value of concrete pill-boxes. He criticized the holding on to front line trenches merely for the sake of holding ground. He also drew attention to the excessive use of the hand grenade in place of the rifle, the value of artillery observation, infantry positions on rear slopes, etc. He came to the conclusion that an improvement in tactics and in equipment (provision of automatic weapons) was necessary.

The *Entente* attacks reached their climax in September and continued throughout October and part of November. During this period the strain on the German troops became very great as there were not sufficient reserves in the west to ensure proper turns in rest. This led to the failure of German divisions at times, especially at Verdun in November and December when the French regained practically all the ground lost earlier in the year. After this the *Entente* offensive of 1916 ceased. The German Front still held.

OBSERVATIONS

Moral factors must be given due weight in making plans in war. Falkenhayn's error in misjudging the strength of the morale of the French Army at Verdun cost the Germans dear.

One of the most important and at the same time most difficult tasks for a commander in modern war is the correct placing of reserves for rapid action on the vast fronts of modern battles. In 1916 the Russians had placed all their reserves on the northern half of their front where they intended to break through, but failed. Consequently they could not exploit Brusilov's success to the full.

CHAPTER XI

THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN

Meantime German counter-measures against Rumania had been put into force. The task of concentrating German and Austrian troops for the conquest of Rumania which had been decided on, was very difficult owing to continued pressure on all other fronts. Three divisions sent from the west in the beginning of September, 1916, for the Rumanian Front had to be diverted to the Carpathians. The northern part of the Eastern Front had to be further weakened to replace them.

The plan of operations against Rumania was as follows (Map XIII):

Field-Marshal von Mackensen with Turkish and Bulgarian forces was to invade the Dobrudja and after clearing it was to force a crossing over the Danube and co-operate in an invasion of Wallachia with the army group of the Archduke Charles, the latter consisting of the First Austrian Army on the north and the Ninth German Army, now under Falkenhayn, on the south. These two armies were to concentrate behind the river Maros sufficiently far back to escape interference by the advancing Rumanians who were now invading Transylvania in force.

Now consider the *Entente* strategy in Rumania. The apparent intention was for Russia and Rumania to invade Hungary from the Carpathians and through Transylvania, on a broad front, the advance of the Rumanians assisting to turn the Austrian flank in the Carpathians and open the passes for which the Russians had been fighting so long.

What actually happened was that the Rumanians seized the passes over the Eastern Carpathians into Transylvania practically without fighting.

Their inexperienced army then advanced far too slowly into Transylvania, thus not interfering in the least with the German concentration behind the river Maros. Meanwhile the Russians continued to batter their heads against the strongly held northern passes. In fact, the Rumanian movement did nothing to assist the Russians. Surely the latter should have added strength and speed to the southern turning movement by sending Russian troops through Rumania into Hungary, thus enveloping their enemy by their weak flank instead of continuing costly frontal attacks.


However, the Germans benefited by this. Mackensen at the beginning of September seized Turtukai, Silistria, and Dobric and caused the surrender of nearly two divisions of Rumanians.

At the end of September, Falkenhayn attacked at the Rotenturm Pass, defeated the First Rumanian Army after hard fighting, and gave battle to the Second Rumanian Army near Fogaras and drove them back through the mountains into Rumania as far as Campulung. This caused the Rumanians further north to retreat before the Austrians to the frontier.

The advance then came to a standstill and it was clear that without fresh troops the Rumanians could not be crushed.

German Supreme Command decided to find the troops at any risk and took three divisions and two cavalry divisions from the Commander-in-Chief in the East and a cavalry division from Belgium. This second concentration was completed early in November. The progress of events was then rapid. Mackensen had attacked and driven back the Dobrudja force beyond Constanza on 19th October. He then transferred the bulk of his army to Sistova ready to cross the Danube.

On 11th November, Falkenhayn attacked at the Vulcan



RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN, 1916

OBSERVATIONS

Envelopment will usually produce more rapid and less costly results than frontal attacks on modern defences. The latter should be avoided except in so far as they are necessary to pin down the enemy. Russia persisted in battering at the Carpathians during the Rumanian Campaign instead of turning them by the south.

Co-ordination of the plans of allies is difficult but very necessary. It is especially liable to fail when the enemy has the initiative.

The German campaign in Rumania on exterior lines succeeded in spite of inferior communications. This was due to very careful co-ordination of the moves of the two wings.

It is only fair to the Russians to say that the majority of their generals were very averse to the Rumanians coming into the war at all, they preferred a neutral state on their left flank to a weak ally.

The immediate result of Rumania entering the war was to prolong the Russian Front by 300 miles and to force them to send no less than twenty infantry and seven cavalry divisions into Rumania in 2½ months, a terrible drain on their thinly held front. Moreover, the Rumanian railways were very inferior and badly worked.

The opinion of Brusilov's staff was that the Russians would have captured Lemberg by the end of October if Rumania had not joined in and caused the withdrawal of Russian troops.

However, the Russian attitude to the Rumanians was undoubtedly bad for an ally, for when a protest was made at Russian General Headquarters regarding the smallness of the force sent to Rumania, Alexyiev, the Chief of General Staff, said:—"I have been all along opposed to the intervention of Rumania, but have been forced to agree to it by pressure from France and England. Now that the principle has been accepted, if the Czar ordered me to send fifteen Russian wounded men there, I would not on any account send sixteen."

CHAPTER XII

"1917"

THE *ENTENTE* OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST, 1917. (MAP XV.)

Everything pointed to the Western Front as the scene of desperate fighting in 1917 in which the German armies would be on the defensive. There was also no doubt that simultaneous attacks would be launched in Italy and on the southern part of the Eastern Front, also in the Balkans.

It appeared possible that the *Entente* Powers in the West would not attack until the weather conditions on the Russian Front permitted simultaneous operations.

In this case April was the earliest date. But the situation on the Somme was so tense all the winter that it appeared an attack might start there at any time.

It appeared very probable that wherever the *Entente* attacks were staged their object would be to cut off or reduce the large salient the Germans had pushed into France whose apex was at Roye.

Now a factor which Ludendorff hoped would quickly affect the *Entente* on the west was the unrestricted submarine campaign which opened on 1st February. He therefore desired to postpone the inevitable battles as long as possible. There were other reasons also, rest and training of troops, shortage of ammunition. Further, the German general reserve was inadequate to meet large attacks. It was necessary to increase it by releasing divisions from the line. On the Western Front there were 154 German divisions at this time facing 190 *Entente* divisions and many of the latter -

were numerically stronger, so it was difficult to thin out the front.

These considerations led to the decision to withdraw from the Gommecourt—Peronne—Noyon salient to a previously prepared and very strongly fortified line known to the Germans as the Siegfried line and to the *Entente* as the Hindenburg line which ran from east of Arras—west of Cambrai and St. Quentin to the river Aisne at Vailly. These new defences had actually been commenced the previous September when the Somme battle was at its climax.

In the middle of February the Germans captured a French divisional order in a local attack in the Champagne which clearly indicated a great French offensive on the Aisne in April. This, combined with the preparations observed about Arras, gave the Germans a good idea of the danger points.

The British attack at Arras on 9th April, and the French on the Aisne and east of Rheims on 16th April were checked after severe fighting and after heavy losses on the German side, but definitely checked.

Now the German withdrawal to the Siegfried line in addition to releasing several divisions into reserve, had other effects on these battles.

The intention of General Nivelle had been to attack on a fairly large scale in the neighbourhood of Roye in conjunction with the British attack at Arras. The object being to absorb as much as possible of the German general reserve before the decisive attacks on the Aisne and east of Rheims. These latter attacks were intended to effect a break-through.

The attacks at Roye were ruined by the German withdrawal and although efforts were made to carry them out at St. Quentin after the Germans had been followed up to that point, they failed to draw in any German reserves and were repulsed by the troops in the line. Therefore Nivelle's main attack was carried out with the German reserves more or less untouched and, what is more, those reserves were concentrated at the danger point owing to the

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
lack of secrecy and surprise on the part of the *Entente*. Owing to their knowledge of the French plan, the Germans were enabled to concentrate forty divisions in the threatened part of the line to face the attack of forty-eight French divisions.

RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. (MAP XIV.)

The Russian revolution occurred in March, the Tsar was deposed and a Socialist Government installed. This, of course, had the effect of postponing any proposed Russian offensive, thereby lightening enormously the German burden of defence on all fronts during the critical period of April. It was not till 1st July that attacks planned on a very large scale commenced all along the Russian Front, but principally in the south. Deserters had kept the German Commander-in-Chief in the East well informed of the Russian plans. A German counter-attack on a large scale was planned and six German divisions were transferred from the west for the purpose. The Russian attacks were stopped in spite of considerable success at Kalush (south of Lemberg) and the counter-attack in the direction of Tarnopol was launched on 19th July. It had the effect of breaking up completely the Russian Front south of Brody down to the Rumanian border. The Russian Army, weakened by the revolution, gave way. The remainder of Galicia and Bukovina were cleared of Russians. This *débâcle* showed that Russia had ceased to exist as a military factor in the war.

* DEFENCE IN FLANDERS

The British attacks at Messines and Ypres caused very heavy losses to the Germans both in men and material. These combined with French attacks at Verdun in August and the Chemin des Dames in October caused a great strain on the Germans. It almost led to the withdrawal of troops from Russia, but Ludendorff adhered to his plans of finishing Russia off this year. He therefore left sufficient troops



RUSSIAN OFFENSIVES IN 1916 AND 1917

there to carry out a series of operations, the attack on Riga, the attack on Osel and Moon Islands, etc.

The chief point of interest was the German development of defensive tactics: first, involving the carefully organized use of counter-attack units and formations, secondly, an increased strength in the front line, but this was soon abandoned in favour of the third development, an advanced zone lightly held in front of their line of resistance. This same idea was developed on the British side in 1918 into an outpost zone and a battle position.

THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

In September the Austrian Army showed signs of collapse under repeated Italian attacks. It became necessary to reinforce with German troops. The only place they could come from was the Eastern Front and that would involve the abandonment of further proposed attacks there. But further successes at the end of the year were very desirable from the point of view of morale of the German Army after its long and arduous defensive in the west.

For these reasons Ludendorff determined to send German troops to Italy, but not for defence. He intended to make full use of them for as great an offensive as possible.

A combined offensive from the Trentino and the Isonzo was very attractive, in fact an operation intended to cut the Italian communications by an attack on two fronts like the crushing of Serbia and Rumania was what Ludendorff would have liked. But the troops were not available this time. Only six to eight German divisions were available, and the Austrians were all very exhausted. So an attack at the weakest point of the Isonzo Front only was decided on.

The attack took place on 24th October and was a complete success, the Germans, under Otto von Below, acting as usual as the spearhead of the attacking armies. The Italians were driven back to the line of the river Piave with great losses in prisoners, guns and stores.

CAMBRAI

From the German point of view the Battle of Cambrai was a complete strategic surprise, and a very unpleasant one. There was nothing to be done but produce reserves to check the British advance. Luckily for the Germans a division on its way from Russia was actually detraining, its leading units having already arrived at Cambrai on 20th November. This division was the decisive factor in localizing the effects of the attack, and its presence was mere luck. By 30th November sufficient troops had been concentrated not only to check the advance, but to counter-attack north and south of the salient that had been created. This counter-attack was successful on the south in breaking into part of the British old line as well as the new.

Ludendorff admits that the fighting at Cambrai gave him valuable hints for a future offensive battle in the west.

OBSERVATIONS


The retreat to the Hindenburg line is an example of a successful strategic withdrawal to a prepared position, upsetting to some extent the enemies' plans and releasing troops for building up a reserve.

Nivelle failed to draw in the hostile reserves before delivering his decisive attack. Also he failed to maintain secrecy or to change his plan when he knew the enemy was aware of it.

Successful deliberate counter-offensives were carried out by the Germans on a large scale both in July, 1917, on the Russian Front and at Cambrai in November, 1917. There were not many instances of such operations during the war. They are difficult to stage rapidly.

Cambrai, the great strategic surprise of position warfare, was very important for its demonstration of the possibilities of tanks properly used.

MAP XV



ENTENTE OFFENSIVE, APRIL, 1917


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From the German a complete strategy. There was nothing the British advance on its way from units having all This division was of the attack, November sufficient to check the advance of the salient that was successful British old line.

Ludendorff and valuable hints

The retreat successful strategy upsetting to soldiers troops for building. Nivelle failed in his decisive or to change his of it.

Successful decisions by the German Russian Front were not many. They are difficult Cambrai, the was very important of tanks proper



CHAPTER XIII

PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE IN 1918

DECISION TO ATTACK IN THE WEST. (MAP XVI.)

Although peace between Germany and Bolshevik Russia was not signed until 3rd March, 1918, the military situation during the previous winter permitted the wholesale transfer of German troops to the west. In fact, by the end of March, there were barely ten divisions fit for transfer left in the east, and these had all been transferred by the end of April. So that Germany had available early in 1918 the whole of her military resources for use on the Western Front; actually in March, 186 divisions (seventy-eight in reserve). This gave her a military preponderance over the *Entente* which she had not enjoyed since 1914. But this preponderance would certainly be at its maximum early in the year in the spring. The arrival of American troops was a very important factor, and closely bound up with this was the question of submarine warfare. The German Navy was at this time as optimistic as ever regarding the rapid influence of submarine attacks; they considered these would prevent the arrival in decisive numbers of the American Army. German Supreme Command, however, did not accept this opinion blindly and counted on the arrival of American formations beginning in the spring of 1918. But it was considered that they would not in any way compensate the *Entente* for the loss of the Russian Army.

Other factors early in 1918 were the condition of Germany's allies. Austria-Hungary was worn out, the best to be hoped from its army was the holding of its position in Italy.

The Bulgarians had achieved their war aims and only longed for peace. They would remain faithful to Germany only so long as success attended the German Armies. Turkey was faithful but quite exhausted.

Finally it became clear that neither the German Army, still less her allies, would stand the strain of a continued defensive. If the *Entente* got an opportunity of attacking in the west, their enormous material resources, machines and weapons, would enable them to mount attacks on a very broad front, and also aim at surprise as at Cambrai. The morale of the German Army was at this time in no condition to withstand such attacks, quite apart from the great loss in men and material they would inflict. Whereas the troops, inferior though they were to those of 1914, had successfully shown their powers in the attack and in a war of movement as in Italy, Galicia and at Cambrai.

Thus all factors in the situation pointed to an offensive to bring about an early decision. This could not be obtained in Italy or Macedonia. The west was the decisive Front. The offensive is the decisive means of making war. Delay would only serve the *Entente* purpose.

The progress in training the troops for the offensive would enable an attack to be made in the middle of March. Therefore, the decision was made to attack in the west in March.

LOCALITY OF THE ATTACK

After a consideration of the forces available, especially the artillery, Ludendorff concluded that he could attack in maximum strength along a continuous front of over 30 miles, utilizing fifty to sixty divisions. He then considered three possible sectors. Flanders between Ypres and Lens, between Arras and St. Quentin or La Fère, and finally both sides of Verdun, pinching out the actual fortress.

Considerations of weather and ground were against Flanders at any rate for an attack early in the year. At Verdun the attack would lead into difficult hilly country.

At Arras—La Fère the country was very suitable except that the old cratered Somme battlefield would have to be crossed.

The *Entente* were holding their Front in great strength about Ypres and Arras, also at Verdun. The weakest portion was on both sides of St. Quentin.

Therefore, from tactical considerations, the centre sector about St. Quentin was the most favourable. Here the attack would strike the enemies' weakest point, the ground was favourable and feasible at any season.

From the strategic point of view, the centre attack offered the most far-reaching results, but only if successful in penetrating to a great depth. The British Army might be separated from the French and crowded into the sea if the attack reached the neighbourhood of the coast via Peronne—Albert—Abbeville. The capture of Amiens alone would create great difficulties for the *Entente* in communications.

The northern attack had strategic objectives of very great importance, that is, the Channel Ports, Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, but the results would not be so decisive.

The Verdun attack might lead to a shortening of the Front, but would only produce tactical results. Ludendorff decided to attack in the centre of the three selected sectors, that is, Arras—La Fère. He was influenced by considerations of time, that is, the possibility of an attack early in the season, before the arrival of the Americans, and by tactical considerations, chiefly the weakness of the enemy.

Ludendorff lays more stress on the question of successful tactics than on the strategic objects to be achieved. He quite rightly says that a strategic plan which ignores the tactical factor will fail, and that strategic objectives cannot be reached unless a tactical success is possible. It is interesting to recall the winter battle in Masuria where Ludendorff's plan achieved an immense tactical success, but failed strategically, as Falkenhayn foretold. On the other side of the picture, consider Nivelle's far-reaching

strategic objectives in April, 1917, which he never came near achieving owing to tactical failure on the Chemin des Dames. It is therefore clear that both strategical and tactical success are essential for the overthrow of the enemy. In open warfare the strategical plan has to be made before the tactical issue arises. In position warfare a tactical success, that is, a rupture of the front, is necessary first.

GERMAN TACTICS IN 1918

A brief summary of the tactical principles laid down by Ludendorff early in 1918 before the German offensive will be of interest.

He insisted on the reduction of losses in the attack by up-to-date tactical training in group tactics (British section), allotting sufficiently wide frontages to enforce a thin assaulting line, and emphasizing the necessity for the use of infantry weapons, that is, the avoidance of mere dependence on an artillery barrage. He insisted that the light machine-gun is the most important infantry weapon and must not be regarded as an auxiliary weapon, it is an integral part of the infantry group. At the same time, the rifleman must be trained to shoot as well.

The heavy machine-gun, light trench mortar, and infantry gun were all auxiliary arms to assist the advance of the infantry in the later stages of the attack when the limit of the artillery barrage was reached or when some strong point held them up. Batteries of infantry guns were being formed, but until they were ready, field guns were to be definitely attached to the battalions, etc., as infantry guns.

Ludendorff considered the battalion to be the tactical unit of the division and the group the tactical unit within the battalion, and his aim was apparently to make each as self-supporting in battle as possible.

Artillery support was to be given in the attack on a scale of twenty to thirty batteries per kilometre, an average of one gun (all natures) per 11 yards.

In the attack in a war of movement the capture of high ground would bring about the tactical decision, and its possession was to be fought for as a matter of principle. This did not by any means involve attacking high ground frontally. We know the German tactics of penetration up the valleys.

CHAPTER XIV

THE FIVE GERMAN OFFENSIVES IN 1918

THE FIRST ATTACK, ARRAS—LA FÈRE. (MAP XVII.)

The actual front of attack on 21st March was from Croisilles to Boursies, a distance of 10 miles, and from Gouzeaucourt to Moy on river Oise, a distance of 25 miles, with a gap between of some 9 miles, the Flesquières salient, which was not attacked; in addition, a subsidiary attack, not in such strength as the others, was made on the 8 miles front between Moy and La Fère. The total front involved was some 54 miles on which a total of sixty-four divisions attacked on the first day.

Three German armies attacked and Ludendorff's intention was that the two northern ones, Seventeenth (Otto von Below) and Second (Von der Marwitz) should carry out the decisive attack, protected on their southern flank by Eighteenth Army (Von Hutier). Up to about 6th March, Ludendorff's intention was that the Somme and the Crozat Canal should be the limit of advance for the Eighteenth Army. The Seventeenth Army had the greatest density of attacking troops. The two northern armies were in Rupprecht's army group and the southern one in the Crown Prince's army group. This involving of two army groups in the battle was intentional on Ludendorff's part in order that Supreme Command, that is Ludendorff, might be able to exert a large influence on the tactical conduct of the battle, and also so that in case of success one army group would be free to carry on operations against the British Army, and one against the French Army.

The German attack was very successful on the south where the defences were weakest and the British troops thinnest on the ground. In addition, the subsidiary attack between Moy and La Fère came as a surprise and had great success.

Their northern attack (Seventeenth Army) was not so successful as was hoped, the failure to cut off the Flesquières salient is put down to this. Ludendorff states that the Seventeenth Army was not commanded with sufficient energy and that too much latitude was given to the corps. Also that their troops attacked in too dense formation.

Owing to this failure the strategical objective of making for the coast via Peronne—Albert—Abbeville was changed. The weight of the attack was shifted south to the Second and Eighteenth Armies with Amiens as their objective. This, of course, they failed to reach.

It is interesting to follow the changes which took place in the German plan as exemplified by the conduct of the operations by Supreme Command. Although Ludendorff ignores the strategic failure of the Germans, there is no doubt that it was a strategic failure. O.H.L. appreciations and orders before the battle indicate that the main object was to split the French and British by reaching the coast, and to defeat finally the British Army. The French were to be held off south of the Somme by the Eighteenth German Army, who originally were given the rôle of forming a defensive flank from Peronne along the Somme and Crozat Canal. On 6th March Ludendorff appears to have concluded from tactical considerations, that a further offensive against the British north of Peronne would be on too narrow a front, and on that date the Crown Prince's group was told that they would be required to push beyond this river line, but still with the object of meeting and holding the French reserves. The task allotted to Rupprecht's army group was the chief one, and Rupprecht's plan was:—first, to pinch out the Cambrai salient; second, for the Second Army

to advance on Peronne and Albert while the Seventeenth Army was to advance north-west on Arras with its left flank on the line Ytres—Bapaume. Rupprecht lays great stress on this latter move being the centre of gravity of the attack of his whole army group. Once the British flank was rolled up to the north, Rupprecht's two offensive armies. (Seventeenth and Second) were to move west on Abbeville and the coast.

Now to turn to the actual events. As early as the evening of 21st March, Ludendorff began to move some seven or eight divisions of the German General Reserve not to the front where the strategic objective lay, between Peronne and Bapaume, but down south to the Eighteenth Army front where the tactical soft spot had been found. And on 23rd March, O.H.L. orders definitely point to a change of the axis of the attack to the south, south of the Somme and south of Amiens. On 26th and 27th March, O.H.L. orders indicate a desire to achieve the original objective, but by a very different tactical operation. For orders were issued for a previously prepared operation against Arras to take place on 28th March and at the same time attacks by weak forces against the Third British Army, O.H.L. thinking that the British were nearly done for, while the bulk of the German forces were to turn south, defeat the French, seize Amiens from the south and then turn and roll up the British line. This involved meeting and defeating all the French reserves, in fact Supreme Command intended to tackle both British and French Armies and defeat them in one operation, a very different conception to the original plan.

Now the question arises, was Ludendorff led away by an easy tactical success in the south to ignore one of the principles of war, the maintenance of the objective? Or, on the other hand, was he right to exploit tactical success although this led his armies against the intact French reserves? Could the Germans have achieved their strategical aim if they had continued battering with larger forces against the

Third British Army? Or, finally, must we regard the whole operation as a gambler's hazard urged on Supreme Command by the force of circumstances and the knowledge that a passive defence would assuredly lose them the war?

It is worth considering the prospects of success for a break-through whatever tactical plan the Germans adopted. At this time the *Entente* had nearly sixty divisions in reserve and had also extremely good road and rail communications on the Western Front. Therefore, however successful the German stratagems to conceal the site of their attack, it was almost certain that the *Entente* reserves could reach the battlefield in time to prevent a break-through.

It would appear that the Germans might have been better advised to have absorbed as many of the *Entente* reserves as possible by preliminary battles, involving less expenditure of force on their part, and to have reserved their greatest efforts for a later battle in which a complete break-through might have been possible. All the lessons of the war pointed to the impossibility of a break-through on the Western Front so long as the enemies' reserves were intact. But of course the Germans were fighting against time.

The first great strategical lesson of this operation is the use of surprise and deception by the Germans. By means of preparations and bluff concentrations of troops at various parts of the Western Front, notably between Ypres and Lens, each side of Rheims, round Verdun, and also right in the south, it was hoped to deceive the *Entente* as to the decisive front. These deceptions were very successful. Extraordinary precautions were taken by the Germans in concentrating their troops for the battle and the Germans undoubtedly achieved a strategic surprise although the approximate front of attack and the date were both known to the British before the battle.

The *Entente* as a whole completely failed to concentrate their armies on the battlefield at the decisive time and place.

The British had a very extended front to hold and were forced to safeguard the Channel Ports and the French coal-fields; they therefore had to keep sufficient forces in the north. Actually half the British reserves, i.e. nine out of eighteen divisions, were north of Arras clear of the battle-front. The French on 21st March had the bulk of their reserves in the Verdun area ready to meet an expected attack there or at Rheims or in Lorraine. Of the thirty-nine French divisions in reserve thirty were east of Rheims. Compare the successful German concentration against Nivelle in April, 1917.

British General Headquarters, although well informed by their Intelligence as to the locality and date of the attack, had misconceived the type of attack and fully expected ample time for the assembly of their reserves on the battle-front. This time they never got and the reserves were perforce thrown in piecemeal to plug up gaps in the front.

THE LYS BATTLE. (MAP XVI.)

The Germans broke off the battle in front of Amiens when the *Entente* resistance hardened early in April. Ludendorff then determined to attack in the plain of river Lys, where preparations were complete and where the front was now held very weakly. The attack was carried out on 9th April, in the first instance by trench divisions, that is, divisions holding the line as opposed to assault divisions, and its object was merely to retain the initiative and exhaust the *Entente*. The initial success led the Germans to hope for great and decisive results and they put a considerable proportion of their available reserves into the battle. They did not succeed in achieving any far-reaching success, although the battle did draw in a number of the French divisions and also drew some of the French reserves to the north. It is notable that the salient created by the Germans in the plain of the Lys became just such a slaughter-house

for the attackers as Falkenhayn criticized in his appreciation of the unsuccessful break-through attacks by the *Entente* in 1915.

This battle was broken off by the Germans at the end of April.

So far the German efforts had been aimed exclusively at the British Army.

SITUATION AT THE END OF APRIL

At the end of April the Germans had 208 divisions on the Western Front; of these 154 were tired divisions, i.e. had been employed in the battles of March and April, and had not yet recovered, and twenty were 2nd Class divisions, unfit for an offensive. A total of seventy-seven, only twelve fresh, were now in reserve mostly between Amiens and the sea.

At this time the *Entente* had 172 divisions, not counting eight British and two Portuguese more or less broken up. They consisted of fifty-four British, 106 French, four American, six Belgian, and two Italian; besides these, there were numbers of Americans undergoing training. The *Entente* had fifteen British and forty-one French divisions in reserve. Practically the whole of the British Army, but only one-quarter of the French Army had been in the battles. The British reserves were principally between Arras and Ypres, and the French between Compiègne and Doullens.

The problem before the German Supreme Command was where to attack next; there was no question that they must attack to keep the initiative and still try and get a decision.

Where was the strategical danger-point for the *Entente*? Could a tactical success be gained there?

Ludendorff considered the Ypres Front, the Somme Front, Chemin des Dames—Rheims, and Montdidier—river Oise, and decided on the Chemin des Dames—Rheims Front. He

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hoped to absorb enough *Entente* reserves there to be able to return to the attack in Flanders. .

OBSERVATIONS

Ludendorff's decision to attack in full strength on the Chemin des Dames must be recognized as wrong if the necessities of the situation are clearly borne in mind.

A rapid and final decision was essential in view of the daily increase in numbers of Americans in France. A mere tactical success, however great, could not end the war. There was no decisive result to be obtained from a breakthrough on the Chemin des Dames, for even a penetration of 30 or 40 miles would not break up the French Armies, the bulk of which were still fresh.

Hitherto all the German efforts had been against the British, surely it would have been best to exploit the exhaustion of one army rather than turn against the fresh army. It may be a matter of opinion which of the *Entente* nations should have been attacked in March, but having started on the British it would be best to go on hammering them.

Again, the only decisive strategic objective within possible reach was the capture of Amiens or even Abbeville which would split the French and British. Therefore, should not Ludendorff have adhered to his original objective however hard its attainment rather than seek after a lightly won but useless success elsewhere.

The Channel ports were also attractive, but their capture alone could not end the war, whereas with the fall of Abbeville, the whole northern coast-line might go too.

If it were necessary to draw off *Entente* reserves from the decisive front, the Amiens area, then a previous subsidiary operation was sound. But it should have had limited forces and limited objectives. The pouring of troops into the salient created on the Marne at the end of May only rendered Foch's ultimate counter-stroke more deadly.

ATTACK ON THE CHEMIN DES DAMES, 27TH MAY AND AT NOYON, 9TH JUNE

On 27th May the Germans attacked with twenty-three divisions on a 33-mile front along the Chemin des Dames, and again succeeded in achieving a complete surprise, at any rate a complete strategical surprise, in that there were no *Entente* reserves concentrated to meet the blow. In fact, the *Entente* line was so thinly held that very rapid progress was made and the river Marne was reached from Chateau Thierry eastwards, an advance in depth of 30 miles by the beginning of June.

On 9th June, after the transfer of heavy artillery, an attack by sixteen divisions was launched between Montdidier and Noyon. The *Entente* were prepared and held and counter-attacked the Germans after an advance of some 6 miles.

This was the turn of the tide, the Germans had registered their last success.

An important point in the Marne salient was the railway and supply question for the Germans. All the railways into the salient went by Soissons or by Rheims. The Germans having failed to take Rheims, only had one broad-gauge line for the supply of the mass of troops in the salient, a very serious matter, which became a definite danger later.

PLANS FOR THE FINAL ATTACKS AT RHEIMS AND IN FLANDERS

At this time, middle of June, Ludendorff considered that Foch had nearly used up his reserves and that not much more could be expected of the French Army. He was too optimistic.

A fresh offensive was the only thing open to the Germans. The French reserves were mostly on the Montdidier—Compiègne—Chateau Thierry Front. The most favourable operation strategically would be an offensive in Flanders

or at the junction of the *Entente* Armies, but there were strong British reserves there, rested and reorganized since the early battles. German documents show that preparations were actually begun for an attack north of the Somme in the direction Doullens—Amiens for the end of June, but this was abandoned and Ludendorff decided to attack again at the weakest point and planned an attack on both sides of Rheims for the middle of July, with one of its objects to improve the communications into the Marne salient. Immediately following this, Ludendorff planned a decisive offensive in Flanders. This was to be the final great effort.

The attacks at Rheims on 15th July were held up by the French before they achieved any success. Their failure was due to lack of surprise. The attacks were mounted exactly like the previous successful German attacks, the preparations were as careful and up to a fairly short time before the date of attack, the *Entente* Front was weakly held. Actually the French knew the sectors and date of the attack and so were able to make very successful arrangements, evacuating the outpost zone east of Rheims and destroying the attackers with their artillery fire. The German commanders and even their troops knew that this great attack had been given away to the French. It is to be supposed that Ludendorff considered he had not the time or freedom of action to delay and change the site, otherwise his adherence to this operation is inconceivable.

ENTENTE COUNTER-STROKE

On 18th July Foch launched his great counter-stroke with the aid of numerous tanks, on the front between Soissons and Chateau Thierry. This attack was very successful in spite of the Germans receiving warning and holding some reserves in readiness. This was the turning-point of the war, the Germans lost the initiative never to regain it.

Owing to the French attack bringing the only broad-gauge railway into the Marne salient under artillery fire on the first

day, German supply to the salient was extremely difficult. Further advances by the French on the Soissons flank rendered the salient untenable for this reason, and the Germans were forced to withdraw. Ludendorff complains of the failure of certain German divisions to stand and fight on 15th July and he continues to bemoan failure of morale in some of the German troops from this time on.

But it must be remembered that it was not the troops nor the collapse of morale in Germany that was to blame so much as the action of German Supreme Command in forming two German armies, one to attack and one to hold the line. The Germans frequently boasted of the great deeds of their storm troops. That is very well so long as they had the initiative, but as soon as they lost it, their other army, the passive, ill-trained, ill-cared-for "line holders," were bound to come into action sooner or later against unforeseen *Entente* attacks. Troops will usually behave in accordance with their training and morale. If they have received little training and if they are regarded as second line inferior troops, they will probably behave as such. This the Germans found to their cost and in places their line broke under the repeated *Entente* attacks where they did not expect it to.

The Flanders offensive was abandoned. From now on German strategical plans ceased to exist. Their operations degenerated into attempts to maintain an unbroken front or to conduct an orderly retreat.

There is one important question worth consideration during the fighting of August to November, 1918, and that is the question of the facilities in the way of roads and railways for a German withdrawal.

The Lille—Hirson—Mézières—Metz railway was the great lateral on the German front throughout the war, vital to them for the transfer of reserves. This was cut before the Armistice at Sedan.

The next point is the difficulty of the evacuation of Belgium (both troops and material) through the bottle-neck

between the Dutch frontier near Liège and, say, Sedan. The difficult country of the Ardennes, poorly provided with railways leading east, lies between. As it was, the Germans at the beginning of the war had to construct a new line through Visé from Aachen so as to enable more traffic to get over the Meuse than Liège could cope with. That traffic was nothing to what there would have been in a forced retreat. Remember the masses of stores abandoned by the Germans in Belgium and also the fact that some of their columns violated the Dutch frontier, when they withdrew after the Armistice.

I think such problems as these must have had their influence on the Germans prior to the Armistice.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE GERMAN OFFENSIVES


Determination to concentrate for the decisive battle is essential to success and a good intelligence service is one of the means of attaining this. A comparison of the *Entente* disposition maps of 21st March and 15th July is very interesting. In the first case we see a thin line of reserves more or less all along the front, rather thinner if anything opposite the front that was actually attacked than elsewhere. On 15th July we see concentrations of reserves in Flanders, the Marne, Rheims and Champagne, east of Champagne not a single division in reserve, and in addition troops were kept available for the great *Entente* counter-stroke.

Surprise is again brought out as one of the chief principles of war. Deceive the opposing commander.

Tactical success and good strategical plans are bound up together. One is no good without the other.

Remember the necessity of economy of force so as to obtain the maximum blow in the decisive attack. Foch succeeded in always keeping a sufficient reserve.

The vital importance of lines of communication is liable to be lost sight of in position warfare. Foch's blow at the



GERMAN OFFENSIVES IN 1918

LEGEND


— DEPARTURE LINE 21ST MARCH

.....	LINE REACHED	21 ST	"
-X-	"	22 ND	"
oooo	"	23 RD	"
-----	"	24 TH	"
-----	"	25 TH	"
-----	"	26 TH	"
-----	"	27 TH	"
-----	"	28 TH	"
xxxx	"	29 TH	"
-----	"	30 TH	"
~~~~~	"	4 TH APRIL	"

DIVISIONS ALLOTTED TO OFFENSIVE -

Scale of Miles.

5 0 5 10



GERMAN ATTACKS, 21ST MARCH TO 4TH APRIL, 1918

lines of communication of the German armies in the Marne salient had decisive results.

It is necessary to keep up-to-date in the means of waging war. Ludendorff utterly failed to appreciate the value of tanks till too late. Tanks were a very, decisive factor on the side of the *Entente* in 1918.

## CHAPTER XV

### LUDENDORFF

#### LUDENDORFF'S CAREER

Ludendorff is the greatest military figure that the war produced in the German armies, the only possible rival being perhaps Mackensen who, although holding independent command extraordinarily successfully in Serbia and Rumania, was never opposed by highly-trained and equipped enemies, and was never faced by the same military problems that Ludendorff went so near to solving.

It is necessary to appreciate Ludendorff's position at German Supreme Command. In name he was only "First Quarter-Master General," equivalent to Deputy Chief of the General Staff, in fact it must be recognized that for the last two years and two months of the war he was the Commander-in-Chief of the German Armies, that is to say, of the largest national army the world has ever seen, and, moreover, up to June, 1918, he was a most successful commander.

To appreciate the fact that it was Ludendorff and not Hindenburg who commanded, it is only necessary to remark that whenever Ludendorff was absent from Supreme Command on leave or in his train visiting armies, he was connected by telephone to all army groups. In fact, where Ludendorff moved, there was Supreme Command.

His position *vis-à-vis* Hindenburg may be compared in some measure to that of Gneisenau with Blücher but more exactly to that of the great Moltke in his relations to the Emperor William I in 1866 and 1870.

Heinrich Ludendorff was born in the province of Posen in 1865, so he was for the Germans a very young general. He received a commission in the infantry in 1882 at the age of seventeen and served with infantry, marines and grenadiers. He passed through the German War College and joined the General Staff as captain in 1895, since when he served almost continuously as a staff officer, first on divisional and corps staffs, then as teacher of tactics at the War College, and finally he joined the inner circle of the Great General Staff at Berlin. Here he became head of the operations section and responsible for the plan of concentration and initial deployment of the German armies for war. It is interesting to note that in 1911-12 Ludendorff urged the formation of three new army corps on a permanent active basis, for he considered them essential to the German plan. The Government and the Reichstag would not agree to this and on Ludendorff commencing a campaign to urge their formation, he was ejected from the Great General Staff and sent to command a regiment. In April, 1914, he became a major-general (at the age of forty-nine) and was given command of an infantry brigade at Strassburg.

On the outbreak of war, Ludendorff became deputy-chief of staff of Bülow's Second Army.

In this position he went as liaison officer with Gen. Von Emmich who was charged with the capture of Liège.

The German plan of attack was to pass several brigades of infantry between the forts by night to converge on and to seize the bridges and citadel while cavalry crossed the Meuse north of the fortress and co-operated against the western face.

The cavalry were checked and the infantry advance went badly. Ludendorff followed one of the infantry brigades in order to be able to report progress. The brigadier was killed and the brigade halted, everything was in confusion. The column was involved in close country between rows of cottages and lanes north of Fort Fleron.

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Ludendorff on his own responsibility moved to the front, took command of the column and successfully fought his way by night to the heights overlooking the Meuse bridges and the city. In the morning the morale of his leading companies began to waver. Ludendorff at once ordered an advance to seize the bridges and thinking he saw the white flag flying over the citadel, motored there alone and discovered his mistake; he then summoned the garrison to surrender, which they did, several hundreds of them.

Later on supporting brigades were moved in and the whole city held.

Towards the end of August, Ludendorff was transferred to the Eastern Front to save the situation in East Prussia and here he became Chief of Staff to Hindenburg and the Eighth Army.

From this point on his fortunes lay first on the Eastern Front and his success may be traced by the German victories there, and from September, 1916, at Supreme Command until his fall in October, 1918.

#### LUDENDORFF'S CHARACTER

Although Ludendorff thought deeply on tactical problems and produced many original tactical ideas, it is not fair to class him merely as a great tactician and no strategist. He has been thus described probably owing to his decisions during the German offensives in 1918. From the nature of the operations in the west in 1917 and 1918 his thoughts may have turned more on tactical problems in those years, but what finer examples of sound and even brilliant strategy can be found than the campaign of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, and the Second Invasion of Poland in 1914. Ludendorff always had large strategical ideas. It appears probable that he makes little mention of strategy in his book in describing the decisions of 1918 owing to those decisions having failed to produce the strategical results desired.

Ludendorff at Supreme Command undoubtedly had a large influence on political matters, he was continually interfering in matters of policy and caused the downfall of more than one Chancellor. His popularity was great in the German Empire, but in the civil government and among the political parties supporting it, his interference was resented.

On one occasion when Ludendorff pressed in vain for Prince Bülow as Chancellor, he remarks:—"Nothing remained but to carry on with my heavy labours and to continue my fight with the Government."

Like most Germans, Ludendorff's judgment of moral factors would appear to have been faulty on occasions. When urging the civil government of Germany to produce more and more men for the front, he disregarded the moral effect on the nation of sending its last manhood to slaughter.

Ludendorff's personal courage, readiness to assume responsibility and driving power are beyond question. He must be a man of great personality and strength of character. He was at all times ready to impose his will on others, for example, Austrian Supreme Command was as clay in his hands even when he was only Chief of Staff of an army group in the east.

On the other hand, he is an egotist of the most pronounced type, making the most of his own achievements and appearing in his book in a vainglorious strain at times. He suffers in this respect by comparison with his great rival Falkenhayn, who, for a German, would appear to have been quite modest.

In spite of such defects Ludendorff worked heart and soul for his country and its cause and used his great brain and character for the service of Germany.

A consideration of the following problem may enable one to form a personal opinion of Ludendorff. If Ludendorff had not been thrown out of the Prussian War Office by the politicians in 1912, he would have been Moltke's Director of

## 122 GERMAN STRATEGY IN THE GREAT WAR

Military Operations at Supreme Command in August, 1914.  
Knowing that he was an ardent disciple of Schlieffen and his war plan, and knowing also his strength of character, would he have kept Moltke on the right path, and what would have been the result of the Marne Campaign?

111 E

150

200

250

270

78 MIL

178

## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX I

#### NORMAL GERMAN ORGANIZATION IN AUGUST, 1914

##### 1. INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Headquarters.

2 Regiments.

Each Regiment had 3 Battalions and 1 Machine Gun Company (6 guns). Each Battalion had 4 Companies which were numbered from 1 to 12 throughout the Regiment, the Machine Gun Company being numbered 13.

##### 2. ACTIVE DIVISION.

Headquarters.

2 Infantry Brigades.

Divisional Troops.

1 Field Artillery Brigade of 2 Field Artillery Regiments.  
Each Field Artillery Regiment, 6 Batteries of 6 guns each.  
Total, 72 guns.

1 Pioneer Field Company Engineers.

1 Divisional Bridging Train.

1 Divisional Telephone Detachment.

1 Cavalry Regiment.

##### 3. ACTIVE CORPS.

Headquarters.

2 Divisions.

Corps Troops.

1 Foot Artillery Battalion, 4 Batteries of 4 guns each.

1 *Jäger* Battalion.

1 Pioneer Field Company Engineers.

Corps Bridging Train.

Corps Telegraph and Telephone Detachment

Columns, Trains, etc.

## 4. CAVALRY DIVISION.

Headquarters.

3 Cavalry Brigades.

## Divisional Troops.

1 Horse Artillery *Abteilung* of 3 Batteries of 4 guns each.3 *Jäger* Battalions, each with 6-gun Machine Gun Company.

1 Machine Gun Battery of 6 guns.

1 Pioneer Detachment Engineers.

Heavy and Light Wireless Stations.

Intelligence Detachment.

Cavalry Motor Transport Column.

## 5. CAVALRY BRIGADE.

Headquarters.

2 Cavalry Regiments each of 4 Squadrons.

## 6. FLYING SQUADRON.

6 Aeroplanes.

1 Squadron was provided for each Active Corps as well as one for each Army.

## STRENGTHS.

*Division.* 17,500 (12,000 Rifles).

4,000 Horses (600 Swords).

24 Machine Guns.

72 Guns.

Reserve Division as above except that it only had 36 guns.

*Corps.* 44,000 (25,000 Rifles).

15,000 Horses (1,200 Swords).

54 Machine Guns.

160 Guns.

Reserve Corps same as above except that it only had 88 guns.

*Cavalry Division.* 7,000 (5,000 Swords and Rifles).

5,500 Horses.

24 Machine Guns.

12 Guns.

In 1914, all Cavalry Divisions did not have 3 *Jäger* Battalions, therefore number of rifles varied.

# APPENDIX II ORDER OF BATTLE OF GERMAN ARMIES, AUGUST, 1914

	Active and Reserve Divi- sions.	Ersatz Divi- sions.	Land- wehr Bri- gades.	Cavalry Divi- sions.
OBERST HEERES LEUTEN (Supreme Command) Chief of General Staff, Von Moltke				
1. FIRST ARMY (Von Kluck)				
II, III, IV, IX Corps				
III, IV, IX Reserve Corps				
10th, 11th, 27th Landwehr Bri- gades				
II Cavalry Corps (Von der Marwitz)				
TOTAL . . . . .	14	—	3	3
2. SECOND ARMY (Von Bülow)				
VII, X, Guard Corps				
VII, X, Guard Reserve Corps				
25th, 29th Landwehr Brigades				
I Cavalry Corps (Von Rich- töfen)				
TOTAL . . . . .	12	—	2	2
3. THIRD ARMY (Von Hausen)				
XI, XII (Saxon), XIX (Saxon) Corps				
XII Reserve Corps				
47th Landwehr Brigade				
TOTAL . . . . .	8	—	1	—
4. FOURTH ARMY (Duke Albrecht of Württemberg)				
VI, VIII, XVIII Corps				
VIII, XVIII Reserve Corps				
49th Landwehr Brigade				
TOTAL . . . . .	10	—	1	—
5. FIFTH ARMY (Crown Prince of Prussia)				
V, XIII, XVI Corps				
V, VI Reserve Corps, 33rd Re- serve Division				
13th, 43rd, 45th, 53rd and 9th Bavarian Landwehr Brigades				
IV Cavalry Corps				
TOTAL . . . . .	11	—	5	2
TOTAL for five right wing armies	55		12	7

Equivalent to:—61 divisions and  
7 cavalry divisions.

	Active and Reserve Divi- sions.	Ersatz Divi- sions.	Land- wehr Bri- gades.	Cavalry Divi- sions.
6. SIXTH ARMY (Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria)				
XXI Corps, I, II, III Bavarian Corps				
I Bavarian Reserve Corps				
Guard, 4th, 7th, 8th Ersatz Divisions				
III Cavalry Corps				
TOTAL . . . . .	10	(a) 4	—	3
7. SEVENTH ARMY (Von Heeringen)				
XIV, XV Corps				
XIV Reserve Corps, Strassburg Reserve Division				
Bavarian Ersatz, 19th Ersatz Division				
109th, 112th, 114th, 142nd Landwehr Regiments				
TOTAL . . . . .	7	(a) 2	2	—
Total for two left wing armies	17	(a) 6	2	3

(a) Note.—The six Ersatz Divisions had seventeen Infantry Brigades.

Equivalent to :—27 divisions and  
3 cavalry divisions.

TOTAL Western Front	72	6	14	10
---------------------	----	---	----	----

Equivalent to :—88 divisions and  
10 cavalry divisions.



## 8. EASTERN FRONT

## EIGHTH ARMY (Von Prittwitz)

I, XVII, XX Corps

I Reserve Corps, 3rd Reserve  
DivisionLandwehr Division (Von der  
Goltz)

2nd, 6th, 70th Landwehr Brigades

1st Cavalry Division

TOTAL . . . . .

Active and Reserve Divi- sions.	Land- wehr Divi- sions.	Land- wehr Bri- gades.	Cavalry Divi- sions.
9	1	(b) 3	1

Equivalent to  $11\frac{1}{2}$  divisions and  
1 cavalry division.

(b) Note.—Main Reserves of Königsberg, Thorn, Graudenz (Landwehr Brigades), equivalent to at least two more divisions, took part in field operations at an early date.

# APPENDIX III

## ORDER OF BATTLE OF GERMAN ARMIES AT THE BATTLES OF THE MARNE, VERDUN, NANCY, 6TH SEPTEMBER, 1914

	Divi- sions.	Infan- try Bri- gades.	Cavalry Divi- sions.
1. FIRST ARMY			
II, III, IV, IX Corps			
IV Reserve Corps			
II Cavalry Corps			
TOTAL . . . . .	10	—	3
Note.—III Reserve and IX Reserve Corps at Antwerp.			
2. SECOND ARMY			
VII, X, Guard Corps			
X Reserve Corps			
I Cavalry Corps			
TOTAL . . . . .	8	—	2
Note.—VII Reserve Corps at Mau- beuge. Guard Reserve Corps to Russia.			
3. THIRD ARMY			
XII (Saxon), XIX (Saxon) Corps			
XII Reserve Corps (less 24th Reserve Division)			
TOTAL . . . . .	5	—	—
Note.—XI Corps to Russia. 24th Reserve Division at Givet.			
4. FOURTH ARMY			
VIII, XVIII Corps			
VIII, XVIII Reserve Corps			
49th Landwehr Brigade			
TOTAL . . . . .	8	1	—
Note.—VI Corps transferred to Fifth Army.			
5. FIFTH ARMY			
V, VI, XIII, XVI Corps			
V, VI Reserve Corps			
33rd Reserve, 2nd Landwehr Divisions			
43rd and 45th Landwehr Brigades			
IV Cavalry Corps			
TOTAL . . . . .	14	2	2
TOTAL for five right wing armies . .	45	3	7

Equivalent to :—46½ divisions and  
7 cavalry divisions.

Note.—14½ divisions less than on 18th August.

## 6. SIXTH ARMY

XXI, II, III Bavarian Corps  
 I Bavarian Reserve Corps  
 1st Bavarian Landwehr Division  
 Guard, 4th, 8th, 10th Ersatz Divisions  
 55th Ersatz, 61st Reserve Brigade  
 III Cavalry Corps

TOTAL

Note.—1st Cavalry Division to Russia.

## 7. SEVENTH ARMY

XIV, XV, I Bavarian, Eberhardt  
 (Ersatz) Corps  
 XIV Reserve Corps  
 19th Ersatz Division  
 55th Landwehr Brigade

TOTAL

TOTAL for left wing armies

Divi- sions.	Infan- try Bri- gades.	Cavalry Divi- sions.
13	2	2
11	1	—
24	3	2

Equivalent to :— $25\frac{1}{2}$  divisions, and  
 2 cavalry divisions.

Note.—A loss of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  divisions and 1 cavalry division since 18th August.

## APPENDIX IV RUSSIAN ORGANIZATION

1. INFANTRY REGIMENT.  
Headquarters.  
4 Battalions.  
Machine Gun Section (8 machine guns).
2. INFANTRY DIVISION.  
Headquarters.  
4 Regiments.  
Field Artillery Brigade of 6 8-gun batteries, and Artillery  
Brigade Park, and other divisional troops.
3. CORPS (normal).  
Headquarters.  
2 Infantry Divisions.  
1 Division Light Howitzers of 2 6-gun batteries, and Howitzer  
Park.  
1 Battalion Engineers of 3 engineer companies and 2 telegraph  
companies, and other Corps troops.
4. CAVALRY BRIGADE.  
Headquarters.  
2 Regiments of 6 squadrons each. Strength of a regiment,  
1,040 all ranks.
5. CAVALRY DIVISION.  
Headquarters.  
2 Cavalry Brigades.  
Horse Artillery Division of 2 6-gun batteries (field guns).  
A Machine Gun Section of 8 machine guns.
6. CAVALRY CORPS.  
From 2 to 5 Cavalry Divisions.

### RUSSIAN ORDER OF BATTLE, AUGUST, 1914

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. Commander-in-Chief, Grand  
Duke Nikolai.  
Chief of General Staff, General  
Yanushkevich.  
General Quartermaster,  
General Danilov.

1. NORTH-WEST FRONT. General Jilinski.  
First Army (Rennenkampf).  
III, IV, XX Corps.  
1st, 2nd, Guard Cavalry Divisions.  
1st, 2nd, 3rd Cavalry Divisions.  
Second Army (Samsonov).  
II, VI, XIII, XV, XXIII Corps.  
4th, 6th, 15th Cavalry Divisions.

2. SOUTH-WEST FRONT. General Ivanov.
  - Fourth Army* (Salza).
  - XIV, XVI, III Caucasian, Grenadier Corps.
  - 13th, 14th Cavalry Divisions.
  - Fifth Army* (Plehve).
  - V, XVII, XIX, XXV Corps.
  - 7th, 1st Don Cossack Cavalry Divisions.
  - Third Army* (Ruzski).
  - IX, X, XI, XXI Corps.
  - 9th, 10th, 11th Cavalry Divisions.
  - Eighth Army* (Brusilov).
  - VII, VIII, XII, XXIV Corps.
  - 12th, 2nd Combined Cossack Cavalry Divisions.
3. INDEPENDENT ARMIES.
  - Ninth Army* (Lechitski) at Warsaw.
  - Guard, I, XVIII Corps.
  - Sixth Army* at Petrograd.
  - Seventh Army* at Odessa.
  - Army of the Caucasus.*
  - I Caucasian. II Turkistan.
4. CORPS FROM DISTANT AREAS en route TO THE FRONTS.
  - II Caucasian.
  - I Turkistan.
  - I, II, III; IV, V, Siberian.
  - XXII (from Finland).
5. TOTAL STRENGTH OF RUSSIAN ARMY AFTER MOBILIZATION, 1914.
  - (i.) 37 Corps containing :—
    - 70 active infantry divisions.
    - 35 reserve infantry divisions.
    - 18 independent rifle brigades.
  - (ii.) 36 Cavalry Divisions.
  - (iii.) *Artillery.*
    - Infantry Division, 48 field guns each.
    - Corps Artillery, 75 batteries, 450 light howitzers.
    - Army Artillery, 21 batteries, 84 guns of heavy artillery.
  - (iv.) Aeroplanes 244.
6. TOTAL STRENGTH IN MARCH, 1917, BEFORE THE REVOLUTION.
  - (i.) 240 Infantry Divisions.
  - (ii.) 54 Cavalry Divisions.
  - (iii.) Aeroplanes 838.

# APPENDIX V

## LIST OF BOOKS CONSULTED.

	TITLE.	AUTHOR.
English.	My War Memories. 2 Vols. . . . .	Ludendorff
	General Headquarters, 1914-16, and its Critical Decisions . . . . .	Falkenhayn
	Duties of the General Staff . . . . .	Schellendorff
	The March on Paris, 1914 . . . . .	Kluck
	Russia in 1914-17 . . . . .	Gourko
	40 days in 1914 . . . . .	Maurice
	Last Four Months . . . . .	Maurice
	Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches With the Russian Army, 1914-17. 2 Vols. . . . .	Haig
	Ludendorff . . . . .	Knox
	Le Grand Etat Major Allemand . . . . .	Buat
French.	Pourquoi l'Allemagne a capitulé . . . . .	Douchy
	La Défense de la Position Fortifiée d'Anvers en 1914 . . . . .	French Gen. Staff
	Der Feltzug der G. Armee gegen die Rumanen und Russen, 1916-17 . . . . .	Lt.-Gen. Deguise
	Graf Schlieffen und der Weltkrieg . . . . .	Falkenhayn
	Der Marnefeldzug, 1914 . . . . .	Foerster
	Mein Bericht zur Marneschlacht . . . . .	Kuhl
	Marnefeldzug . . . . .	Bülow
	Die Marneschlacht, 1914 . . . . .	Hausen
	Bis Zur Marne . . . . .	Baumgarten
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